The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly Force to Protect Unborn Children from Abortionists by Rice, Charles E. & Tuskey, John P.




The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly Force to
Protect Unborn Children from Abortionists
Charles E. Rice
Notre Dame Law School, charles.e.rice.1@nd.edu
John P. Tuskey
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles E. Rice & John P. Tuskey, The Legality and Morality of Using Deadly Force to Protect Unborn Children from Abortionists, 5 Regent
U. L. Rev. 83 (1995).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/261
THE LEGALITY AND MORALITY OF USING




On March 10, 1993, Michael Griffin shot and killed an abor-
tionist outside a Pensacola, Florida abortuary. Griffin has since
been tried and found guilty of murder.1 On July 29, 1994, outside
yet another abortuary in Pensacola, Paul Hill shot and killed an
abortionist and his escort, and wounded the escort's wife. 2 Hill
has been convicted in federal court of violating the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), and in state court of
murder, a conviction for which he has been sentenced to death. 3
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School and Senior Fellow, The American
Center for Law and Justice.
** Research Counsel, American Center for Law and Justice. The views expressed
in this article are the authors' views and not necessarily those of the American Center
for Law and Justice.
1. See Eloise Saholz, The Death of Doctor Gunn, NEWSWEEK, March 22, 1993, at 34,
35.
2. Abortion Protestor is Guilty Under Clinic Access Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994,
at A18. In December 1994, John Salvi III allegedly shot and killed two abortuary workers
and wounded five others in two different abortuaries in Brookline, Massachusetts. Salvi
was apprehended in Norfolk, Virginia, after firing shots into an abortuary there. See
Clinic Slaying Suspect Caught Shooting at Norfolk Abortion Center Tied to Massachusetts
Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1995, at Al. The Brookline-Norfolk assailant appears to have
simply directed fire at anyone inside the abortuaries. For reasons that will be made clear,
there is no possible legal or moral justification for the Brookline attacks; consequently
this article will not discuss further the alleged actions of John Salvi III. One other person
has been wounded in a shooting by an anti-abortionist. In 1993 in Wichita, Kansas,
Rachelle Shannon shot and wounded an abortionist in both arms. She was sentenced to
11 years imprisonment for the shooting. Woman Who Shot Doctor Gets Nearly 11 Years,
WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1994, at A24.
3. FACE, 18 U.S.C. S 248 (West 1994), provides in pertinent part that
(a) Whoever-
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction intentionally
injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from,
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While most leaders of the pro-life movement have condemned
these killings, there is a temptation among some to hail Griffin
and Hill as heroic defenders of the unborn, or at least to claim
that the killings were justified.
The killings, and the temptation to defend those killings,
must be viewed in the context of the violence spawned inside
abortuaries by Roe v. Wade4 and Doe v. Bolton 5 the Supreme
Court's 1973 decisions that invalidated the abortion laws of all
fifty states and required states to make almost all abortions legal.
The Pensacola killings are symptoms of a deep social illness that
can be traced in large part to Roe and Doe.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a woman has a funda-
mental right to privacy, which is broad enough to include the
right to choose whether to end her pregnancy by abortion. While
stating this right is not absolute, the Roe Court held that the
state may not prohibit elective abortion up to the point where
the unborn child becomes viable (that is, when the unborn child
is able to live outside the womb).6 The Court did hold that after
viability, the state could restrict and even prohibit abortion
except "where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." 7 But in
Doe v. Bolton, the Court defined maternal health to include
"psychological as well as physical well-being" and held that "the
medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all the factors
- physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age - relevant to the well-being of the patient." Given this
obtaining or providing reproductive health services ...[or] ... (3o intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or
attempts to do so, because such facility provides reproductive health serv-
ices.... is subject to certain civil and criminal penalties provided in S 248
(b) and (c). Criminal penalties may range from a maximum $10,000 fine and
up to six months in prison for a first offense of non-violent physical obstruc-
tion to life imprisonment if death results. See S 248 (b) (emphasis added).
Hill was convicted in federal court on October 5, 1994. Hill's only defense at that
trial was to say at opening and closing: "This government is unjust because it does not
protect innocent life. To the extent we take part in this evil, we must answer to God.
May God help us all." See Abortion Foe Convicted Under Clinic Access Law, ATLANTA
CONSTITUTION, Oct 6, 1994, at Al. In November of 1994, Hill was convicted in state court
of murder and subsequently sentenced to death on December 6, 1994. See Anti-Abortion
Killer Sentenced to Die, VIRGINIAN PILOT, Dec. 7, 1994, at Al.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
6. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-165.
7. Id. at 165.
8. Doe, 410 U.S. at 191-92.
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open-ended definition of "health," it is fair to say that in Roe and
Doe the Court established (or, if you will, invented) a "fundamen-
tal right" to abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy.9
The Court expressly recognized that if the unborn child
were a "person" the case for recognizing a right to abortion
would collapse. 10 The Court in Roe was only able to hold as it
did because of its conclusion that the unborn child is not a person
entitled to protection by the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Note,
however, that the Court did not decide that the unborn child is
not a human being. Given the scientific data supporting the
conclusion that human life begins at conception 12 and the logical
deduction that the living offspring of two human parents cannot
be anything but human (has a woman ever given birth to a
chimpanzee?), the Court could hardly deny the unborn child's
humanity outright. Indeed, three years before the Court decided
Roe, an editorial favoring legal abortion appeared in the California
Medical Association's official journal which argued:
It will become necessary and acceptable to place relative
rather than absolute values on such things as human lives
[because of demographic, ecological, and social problems]. This
is quite distinctly at variance with the [traditional] Judeo-
Christian ethic [which places an absolute value on life] ....
The process of eroding the old ethic and substituting the new
has already begun. It may be seen most clearly in changing
attitudes toward human abortion .... Since the old ethic has
not been fully displaced, it has been necessary to separate the
idea of abortion from the idea of killing, which continues to be
socially abhorrent. The result has been a curious avoidance
of the scientific fact, which everyone really knows, that human
9. See generally Charles E. Rice, Issues Raised by the Abortion Rescue Movement,
23 SUFFOLK L. REV. 15 (1989).
10. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57; see also id. at 157 n.54 (suggesting that if the unborn
is a person, the state may not allow abortion even to save the mother's life).
11. Id. at 158.
12. See, e.g., The Human Life Bill - Hearings on S.158 Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1981)
(testimony of Dr. Hymie Gordon, professor of Medical Genetics at the Mayo Clinic) ("[T]he
question of the beginning of life - when life begins - is no longer a question of
theological or philosophical dispute .... [I]t is an established fact that all life, including
human life, begins at the moment of conception."); Id. at 22-23 (testimony of geneticist
Dr. Jerome LeJeune) ("To accept the fact that after fertilization has taken place a new
human has come into being is no longer a matter of taste or opinion. The human nature
of the new human being from conception to old age is not a metaphysical contention, it
is plain experimental evidence."). See generally BERNARD N. NATHANSON, M.D., THE
ABORTION PAPERS: INSIDE THE ABORTION MENTALITY (1983).
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life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra- or
extra-uterine until death. The very considerable semantic gym-
nastics which are required to rationalize abortion as anything
but taking a human life would be ludicrous if they were not
often put forth under socially impeccable auspices.8
Roe is the application of the editorial's reasoning. Forsaking
the editorial's forthrightness about the beginning of human life,
the Supreme Court in Roe engaged in the "semantic gymnastics"
the editorial suggested and curiously avoided the "scientific fact"
that "life begins when life begins' 14 - at conception. Instead,
the Court stated that it "need not resolve the difficult question
of when life begins."'5 While the Court was unwilling to say so
in so many words, its essential holding in Roe was that even if
the unborn child is a human being, it is not a "person" worthy
of legal protection for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In effect, Roe declared that the question of which human beings
are worthy of protection is a matter for the lawmaker to decide. 16
This is the foundational proposition common to both the decla-
ration in the Dred Scott 7 case that slaves were property rather
13. Editorial, A New Ethic for Medicine and Society, 113 CALIFORNIA MEDICINE 67-
68 (Sept. 1970) (emphasis added).
14. See NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 22.
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. In Dr. Nathanson's view, this statement by the Court in
Roe "sweeps us back with dizzying speed to the state of the biologic arts in the eighteenth
century" when the theory of spontaneous generation - that is, the theory that animal
life could spontaneously arise from putrefying matter - held sway. In the mid-eighteenth
century, Lazzaro Spallanzoni disproved the theory of spontaneous generation, showing
that animal life could not occur without the direct contact of sperm and ovum. According
to Nathanson, "Spallanzoni's work had thereafter not been seriously challenged until Roe
v. Wade, when the Magnificent Seven seemed to disavow it." NATHANSON, supra note 12,
at 158.
16. See 410 U.S. at 158-59. Not all courts have found it necessary to use "semantic
gymnastics" to obscure their holding that it is up to the lawmaker's whim to decide
which members of the human race qualify as persons worthy of legal protection. Byrn v.
New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 1972) involved a suit
seeking to overturn New York's liberal 1970 abortion law and enjoin abortionists from
committing any abortions except those necessary to save the mothers' lives. The trial
court granted a preliminary injunction, but the New York Court of Appeals ultimately
vacated the injunction and ordered the suit dismissed. The court of appeals conceded
that the unborn child "is human ... and is unquestionably alive." Id. at 888. But the
court held that it is for the legislature (within constitutional limits) to decide what human
beings (or other entities) are persons with legal rights and privileges. Id. at 889. The
question of personhood is thus "a policy determination ... and not a question of biological
or 'natural' correspondence." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, human beings are not
persons unless the law (whether statutory or constitutional) says they are persons. For
further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 220-224.
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-406, (1856).
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than persons, and the "legal" Nazi extermination of Jews and
other "undesirables" before and during World War II.18
By arbitrarily stripping millions of human beings of any
entitlement to legal protection, Roe has helped convey the simple
and stark message that life is cheap. That message is bound to
have consequences. For example, one of the rationalizations ad-
vanced for legal abortion was the need to prevent the birth of
"unwanted" children, who purportedly would be subject to lives
of misery and abuse (the unstated assumption being that certain
death is preferable to possible abuse). Yet, one study in Los
Angeles showed that ninety percent of child abuse cases involved
children from "wanted" pregnancies. 9 Though ironic, this finding
should not be surprising. If a woman has the unquestionable right
to destroy her child (with the help of a medical professional) on
any day before birth, why should parents, even of wanted chil-
dren, not conclude they have the right to abuse those children
at will after birth?
In the Garden of Gethsemene the night before his crucifixion,
Christ told his apostles and the crowd gathered to arrest him
that "all who take the sword will perish by the sword." 20 As has
been wisely pointed out, this statement "is an assessment of the
reciprocal nature of violence. Violence begets violence and is
contagious."21 Thus by violence the social order unravels. Roe v.
Wade, by sanctioning the violent execution of innocent unborn
children, by their own mothers at the scalpel-wielding hands of
professionals ostensibly dedicated to preserving human life, has
contributed in a unique way to the cycle of violence and the
unraveling of our social order.
Prophetic voices have warned of this unraveling. Pope John
Paul II stated in a 1979 speech at the Capital Mall in Washington,
18. See Byrn, 286 N.E.2d at 892 (Burke, J., dissenting); Charles E. Rice, Some
Reasons for a Restoration of Natural Law Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539,
551-52 (1989); Rice, Abortion Rescue Movement, supra note 9, at 23. See generally WILLIAM
BRENNAN, THE ABORTION HOLOCAUST (1983).
19. See Edward Lenoski, M.D., A Research Study on Child Abuse, HEARTBEAT, Winter
1980, at 16-17 (cited in BRIAN CLOWES, THE PRo-LIFE ACTIVIST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 41-4). Child
abuse in general has risen sharply in this country since 1972, and is now six times higher
than it was in 1972. See BRIAN CLOWES, THE PRO-LIFE ACTIVIST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA at 41-6-
7.
20. Matthew 26:52 (New American) (All biblical quotations in this article are from
the New American Bible); see also Keith A. Fournier, The Sword Belongs in its Sheath,
CASENOTE (American Center for Law and Justice, Virginia Beach, VA.), Sept. 1994, at 5-
6.
21. John W. Whitehead and Franky Schaeffer, Violence and the Prolife Movement,
in ARRESTING ABORTION 32, 35 (John W. Whitehead ed., 1985).
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D.C. that "[iff a person's right to life is violated at the moment
he is first conceived in his mother's womb, an indirect blow is
struck also at the whole of the moral order which serves to
ensure the inviolable goods of man. Among those goods, life
occupies the first place." 22 Mother Teresa reiterated this theme
even more bluntly in her address to the National Prayer Break-
fast in Washington on February 3, 1994: "[T]he greatest destroyer
of peace today is abortion, because it is a war against the child,
a direct killing of the innocent child, murder by the mother
herself. And if we accept that a mother can kill even her own
child, how can we tell other people not to kill one another?"'
Since abortion involves the killing of innocent life, killing in
which the victim's own mother is a participant, it is natural that
legalized abortion would elicit a deep emotional response from
those who oppose it. Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a former abortionist
and co-founder of the National Abortion Rights Action League,
neatly summed up the reason for many pro-lifers' passionate
reaction to abortion:
I queried a woman whom I respected for her otherwise calm
and intellectual approach to complex questions as to why she
became so heated and intense on this particular issue. She
looked at me almost uncomprehending for a moment, then
replied: "Doctor, if you walked into a room in your hospital
from which screams were emanating and found a woman
beating her six-week old infant with a blunt instrument -
blood everywhere and the infant grotesque and unrecogniza-
ble from the marks of the beating - and if you tried to stop
it and were told it was legal, good for the infant and even
better for the mother, and if you came upon this scene daily
for ten years and were powerless to stop it, you'd get pretty
heated up too." When articulated in these simple, visceral
terms, the emotion generated by this issue became all too
understandable. 24
Unfortunately, emotion tends to cloud the intellect, causing
people in their zeal often to take matters into their own hands.
When the Supreme Court declares it a "fundamental right" for
22. John Paul II, Stand Up for Life, in THE ZERO PEOPLE 261, 262 (Jeff Lane Hensley
ed., 1983).
23. Mother Teresa Issues Plea for Americans to Stop Abortion, UPI, Feb. 3, 1994,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, News file.
24. NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 2. Nathanson credits this insight with finally
enabling him to "commit my heart to the pro-life cause, and ... pass[ I from disinterested
observation, through indignant protest, to angry resistance." Id.
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a woman to have her unborn child killed, and when this killing
proceeds unabated for over twenty years, it is not surprising
that the Michael Griffins and Paul Hills of this world would
conclude that "if it is OK to kill the child, it must be OK to kill
the abortionist to save the child." Although this is not sound
moral reasoning, 5 it is understandable, and foreseeable, that some
would break with reasonable thought processes in a society where
a child is not even safe from its own mother and members of the
"healing" profession.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2
the Supreme Court reaffirmed what it understood to be Roe v.
Wade's "central holding." While Casey did uphold some abortion
restrictions that the Court could have held unconstitutional under
Roe and its progeny,2 nothing in Casey casts any doubt on Roe's
holdings that the unborn, whether or not human, is not a person,
and that a woman, in effect, has the right to have an abortion
at any time throughout all nine months of pregnancy.2
In reaffirming Roe's "central holding," the joint opinion in
Casey stated that the Court's abortion decisions, particularly Roe,
had "call[ed] the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted
in the Constitution," a mandate which the American people will
be "tested by following." Yet far from resolving the abortion
issue, the Court's arrogant fiat has done "more than anything
else to nourish it... ."3 "[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for
the deep passions [abortion] arouses, by banishing the issue from
the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers,
the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight ... the
Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish."81 The political
process is like a release valve on a pressure cooker; close the
valve, and an explosion is bound to occur. Michael Griffin and
Paul Hill are that explosion. Seeing no hope for progress in the
25. See infra part II.
26. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
27. See id. at 2881-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 2803-33 (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter); id.
at 2838-43 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("implicit in the Court's analysis" is
the reaffirmation of Roe's rejection of the argument that the "fetus is a 'person"'); id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 2843-55 (joint opinion) (reaffirming
Roe's holding that abortion may not be prohibited even after viability if necessary to
preserve the mother's life or health).
29. Id. at 2815-16 (joint opinion).
30. Id. at 2882 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 2885 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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normal arenas of public debate and political change, Griffin and
Hill decided it was time to act on their tortured and anguish-
driven moral reasoning that justifies killing as a response to
killing.
Three people died in Pensacola at the hands of Michael
Griffin and Paul Hill, and five people in total have died at the
hands of anti-abortionists during the twenty-two years since the
Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973. During that same time, almost
thirty million innocent unborn babies have been slaughtered. 32
"Today, one out of every three babies conceived in America
is aborted .... Abortion claims the lives of 131,520 children
each month, 4,384 each day, 183 each hour, 3 each minute,
and 1 every 20 seconds." Through abortion alone, America
has killed about four times more people than the combined
number of adults, adolescents, and children (in or outside the
womb) who lost their lives under the extermination polices
of Nazi Germany. 33
Against the backdrop of thirty million deaths by abortion, five
deaths hardly represents an "epidemic" of anti-abortion killings.
Certainly, abortionists face much less of a threat from abortion
opponents than unborn children face from abortionists.
But to say that Griffin's and Hill's actions were understand-
able and resulted in "only" three deaths is not to say that killing
abortionists is either legally or morally justified. This article will
explore those questions. Is killing abortionists as they arrive at
abortuaries to perform regularly scheduled abortions a legally
justifiable use of force in defense of another person's life? Under
commonly accepted criminal law principles of justification, a
person normally is entitled to use force - even deadly force -
when necessary to save a person's life from an aggressor bent
on taking that life. But because Roe and its progeny have made
abortion a constitutionally protected right, courts would predict-
ably hold that using force against an abortionist is not legally
justified, despite the fact that the motive for that force is to
defend innocent human life.
Even if intentionally killing an abortionist can be legally
justified, is it morally justified? Roman Catholics apply Catholic
moral teaching to this question. That teaching embodies universal
32. See WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS 68-69
(1994).
33. KEITH A. FOURNIER, IN DEFENSE OF LIFE 11 (1994) (quoting THOMAS A. GLESSNER,
ACHIEVING AN ABORTION-FREE AMERICA BY 2001, at 23 (1990)).
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moral principles that are useful to anybody - Catholic or non-
Catholic - who cares to analyze the moral issue. Based on
Catholic moral teaching, intentionally killing abortionists as Grif-
fin and Hill did is morally wrong, at least at a time when we are
not in a state of justified rebellion. For now, there are alterna-
tives to violence - particularly prayer and the uncompromising
proclamation of the truth about abortion - that are more ap-
propriate, prudent, and in the long run, effective than escalating
the violence that abortionists, spurred by the Supreme Court,
have started.
I. Is KILLING THE ABORTIONIST LEGALLY JUSTIFIED?
A. The General Principle of Justification by Necessity
Suppose Baker, walking down the street one day, sees Able
in his front yard pointing a shotgun at his son and yelling, "I'm
going to kill you!" Baker jumps the fence surrounding Able's
yard, runs onto the lawn, tackles Able, and wrenches the gun
out of his hands.
Would the fact that Baker was acting in a way he thought
reasonably necessary to save Able's son's life provide a defense
to criminal charges of trespass (for running onto Able's property),
assault and battery (for tackling Able), and robbery (for forcibly
taking Able's gun)?3' Most, if not all, would intuitively answer
that of course Baker should have a defense to these charges. The
law in most states, consistent with this intuition, would exonerate
Baker.
The principle allowing Baker to violate the law and save
Able's son can be called generally the principle of justification
by necessity. 35 That principle provides, in general, that otherwise
criminal conduct can be justified, and therefore not criminal, in
circumstances in which that conduct is necessary to prevent a
greater harm or evil.36 Indeed, the necessity principle as embodied
34. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1347, 105, 1193 (5th ed. 1979) (assault and battery
is "unlawful touching of another;" criminal trespass is "entering [onto] land" that is
"fenced or otherwise enclosed"; robbery is "taking of ... personal property ... of another,
from his person, ... and against his will, accomplished by means of force.").
35. See People v. Richards, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597, 604 (Ct. App. 1969).
36. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW §5 5.4,
5.8 (2d ed. 1986); PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 5 121, 124, 131, 133,
(1984); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 5 20 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS]; MODEL PENAL CODE SS 3.01, 3.04, 3.05, 3.10 & Comments
(Proposed Official Draft 1962 with Revised Commentary 1985).
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in most states' law would exonerate Baker for shooting and killing
Able if that action was necessary, or if Baker reasonably believed
that action was necessary, to save Able's son's life.37
One might suggest that like Baker, Michael Griffin and Paul
Hill were merely taking action they reasonably believed neces-
sary to save innocent human lives from unjust aggression. After
all, Griffin and Hill knew, or at least reasonably believed, that
the abortionists they attacked were going to commit abortions
on the days they were shot. Abortions kill unborn children;
unborn children are human beings; therefore, the abortionists
were going to be killing innocent human beings. Griffin and Hill
believed (or might claim to have believed) that killing the abor-
tionists was necessary to save the lives of the unborn babies the
abortionists were scheduled to kill. If this belief was reasonable,
one might argue that the principle of justification by necessity
could have exonerated Griffin and Hill, just as it would exonerate
Baker.
To test this thesis, we must examine the principle of 'justi-
fication by necessity in more detail. The necessity principle is
embodied in several different but related defenses, which have
been codified, at least to some extent, in many states. 8 Federal
courts also have recognized the principle as a defense.3 As a
general matter, "[aictions taken in self-defense, in defense of
property or other persons, or to avert a public disaster or a
crime may be held non-criminal under this 'justification' doc-
trine."40
The necessity principle has been formulated in general terms
in general necessity or "lesser evil" defenses. These defenses
typically involve a general weighing of the harm caused by the
defendant's conduct against the harm that would have resulted
if the defendant had not acted. The two principal American
formulations of the general necessity defense are found in the
Model Penal Code and the New York Penal Law. The Model
Penal Code's general necessity defense may justify an otherwise
criminal act when "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by [the
defendant's] conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented
37. Defense of others is discussed specifically in part I (B).
38. See statutes cited in ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 124, at 45, 46 n.1 and MODEL
PENAL CODE S 3.02, cmt. 5 n. 21.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 517 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 1982), United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d
1159 (5th Cir. 1982).
40. Simpson, 460 F.2d at 517.
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by the law defining the offense charged."4' The New York Penal
Law provision provides that for conduct to be justified, "the
desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury [to the defendant
or a third person must] clearly outweigh the desirability of
avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining
the offense in issue. '42
Besides the lesser evil defenses, other defenses have devel-
oped that embody the necessity principle. These are more specific
defenses, geared to more specific situations; they are "a part of
the law of necessity which has attained relatively fixed rules."'
Among these defenses are self-defense and the defense that
justifies the use of force against a person to repel an attack by
that person on a third person (generally called defense of others).
If killing an abortionist can be justified legally, that killing likely
would have to meet the requirements of the defense of others
justification.44 We will proceed to analyze that defense and its
application to the killing of an abortionist.
B. Defense of Others.
Almost all American jurisdictions have adopted some form
of defense of others justification either by statute or judicial
decision.45 These formulations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
41. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.02(a); see Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Political
Choice: The General Justification Defense - Criteria for Political Action and the Duty to
Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986).
42. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 35.05 (McKinney 1987); see Greenawalt, supra note 41, at 4.
43. LAFAVE & SCOTT. supra note 36, S 5.4(b), at 443.
44. For example, S 3.02(1)(b) of the Model Penal Code provides that the general
choice of evils defense applies where "neither the Code nor other law defining the offense
provides ... defenses dealing with the specific situation involved." The introduction to
Article 3 of the Code explains that "Section 3.02 ... yields to more specific provisions
when those deal with the particular situation posed in any concrete case." Similarly, the
New York Penal Law provides that the general justification defense applies "[ulnless
otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of
physical force." In Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Alaska
1981), a case involving trespass at an abortuary to rescue unborn children from death,
the court noted that when an illegal action is taken in response to human force, the
proper defenses are "duress, defense of others, or crime prevention." Of the three, the
only defense likely to apply to an abortionist's killing would be defense of others. But
see United States v. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 1994) (opinion
granting government's motion in limine), in which the court suggested that Paul Hill
might be able to raise a general necessity defense to justify his killings. Hill did not
raise such a defense and was convicted. See supra, note 3. See also a possible argument
for applying the general necessity defense, infra part I. B. 3. b.
45. See statutory references and cases collected in ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 133,
at 101 n.1.
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tion, but certain general principles underlie all of these formu-
lations. Professor Robinson, in his treatise on criminal defenses,
posits that "[all justification defenses, [including self-defense and
defense of others] have the same internal structure: (1) Triggering
Conditions plus the Response requirements of (2) Necessity and (3)
Proportionality.46 This structure provides a convenient frame-
work for discussing the general principles of the defense of others
justification. Using this framework, one could generally state the
defense of others justification, in a case where the defendant has
used deadly force,47 as follows: When an actor reasonably believes
an aggressor is unjustifiably using or going to use deadly force
against another person (the triggering condition), the actor may
use force against the aggressor "when and to the extent" he rea-
sonably believes necessary to protect the other person (the necessity
principle). That force may include deadly force, if necessary (the
proportionality requirement).4 With this general formulation in
mind, we may proceed to examine the defense of others justifi-
cation's specific requirements and apply those requirements to
determine whether a defendant who kills an abortionist has a
possible defense for his action.
1. The Actor's Reasonable Belief
Suppose that in the Able and Baker example, Baker's con-
clusion that Able was about to kill his son was wrong; although
Able was pointing a gun at his son and yelling, "I'm going to kill
you!," that was just a strange form of "male bonding" that Able
and his son engaged in. Would Baker have a defense for using
force to (he believed) save Able's son's life?
46. Id. S 121, at 2.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.11 (2) defines deadly force as "force that the actor uses
with the purpose of causing or that he knows to create a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at
a vehicle in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force .... " See
also N.Y. PENAL LAW S 10.00 (11), which defines "deadly physical force" as "physical force
which, under the circumstances. .. used, is readily capable of causing death or other
serious physical injury." Abortion, which always intends the unborn child's death, and
killing an abortionist both fall easily into these rather typical definitions of deadly force.
48. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 133, at 102; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S
5.8, at 463; MODEL PENAL CODE SS 3.04; 3.05. None of these sources state the defense of
others justification exactly as we have stated it, but we believe our statement of the
justification represents a fair statement of the general principles embodied in the




If justification for Baker's act depends on the situation
actually being as Baker believed it to be, Baker would not have
a defense. However, Baker acted for a noble purpose - to save
Able's son's life - and it seems unjust for the law to punish
Baker for his reasonable mistake. Fortunately for Baker, justifi-
cation for his action generally would not depend on Able actually
using or threatening deadly force against his son. Instead, most
jurisdictions would hold Baker's use of force against Able justified
so long as Baker reasonably believed that Able was using or was
about to use unjustified force against his son.49
Besides applying to the actor's conclusion that a person is
using or is going to use unjustified force, the reasonable belief
rule also applies to the actor's conclusion that the action he takes
is necessary to protect the third person.w° If Baker reasonably
believed the force he used was necessary, but it turned out it
was not, Baker's action still would be justified.
The issue of reasonable belief may come up in an abortionist
killer's defense in a number of ways. Most obvious is the issue
of whether the defendant reasonably believed that killing the
abortionist was necessary. However, questions may also arise,
for example, as to the defendant's belief about whether the
abortionist was actually going to perform abortions that day,
whether those abortions were legal, and about the unborn child's
humanity or personhood. We will examine these questions in
subsequent sections as we discuss and apply the other specific
requirements for asserting the defense of others justification,
49. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.8, at 463 ("The prevailing rule is that
one is justified in using reasonable force in defense of another ... when he reasonably
believes that the other is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm and that the use
of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.") (emphasis added); see, e.g., ALA. CODE
S 13A-3-23 (Michie 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-406 (West 1989); N.Y. PENAL LAW S
35.10 (McKinney 1987); FLA STAT. ANN. S 776.012 (West 1992). The Model Penal Code
goes even further. Suppose an actor actually, but unreasonably, believes that force is
being used or threatened against another person, that the force being used or threatened
is unjustified, or that the responsive action he takes is necessary. If justification depends
on reasonable belief, then the actor would have no defense, which could subject him to
conviction for an intent-based offense, possibly even murder. The Model Penal Code has
rejected this result. Instead, the Code bases justification for defense of others on the
actor's actual belief. If that belief is negligent or reckless, the actor will not be completely
stripped of his defense. Instead, he will be subject only to prosecution for crimes requiring
negligence or recklessness, but not for any crime based on intent. See MODEL PENAL
CODE SS 3.04, 3.05, 3.09; S 3.04, cmts. 2(a) & (d); S 3.09, cmt. 2. For a list of jurisdictions
that have adopted this position in their criminal codes, see S 3.04, cmt. 2, n.11. For a list
of jurisdictions that have not adopted this position in their criminal codes, see id. n.12.
50. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.8, at 463.
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including particularly the necessity of force and the type of force
one may lawfully defend against.
2. Necessity
The key element in the defense of others justification is
necessity. An actor may use force against an aggressor when and
to the extent necessary to protect the other person. Both the time
at which the defendant acts and the way in which he acts -
including the amount of force he actually uses - are important
in determining if that use of force is justified. An actor should
not be allowed to use force when he does not need to, or to use
more force than he needs. For example, if Baker reasonably could
prevent harm to Able's son by tackling rather than shooting
Able, it is not necessary for Baker to shoot Able; likewise, if an
actor can delay using force until a later time without significantly
increasing the risk to the innocent party by waiting, he should
wait. 51
Most jurisdictions typically impose some kind of temporal
limitation on the use of defensive force beyond the general
requirement that force is justified only when necessary. Juris-
dictions state the limitation differently. For example, many ju-
risdictions only allow a person to use force to defend against the
"imminent" use of force against another.5 2 This language reflects
a presumption that force is not actually necessary until harm is
close at hand.5 In a variation on this theme, some states' codes
allow the use of force or deadly force against an attacker who is
"about to use" force54 or when a person is "about to be injured.."55
On the other hand, the Model Penal Code says nothing
explicit about how close at hand the harm must be before a
51. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 131(c), at 77. As noted, this rule is tempered by
a requirement that the actor's assessment of necessity be reasonable, not necessarily
correct. Thus, if an actor reasonably believes he must use a certain amount of force, or
that he must act now because waiting will appreciably increase the risk to the innocent
party, the defense of others justification will be available in most jurisdictions.
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. S 776.02 (may use force to defend against the
"imminent" use of force); N.Y. PENAL LAW S 35.15(1) (may use force to defend against
the "use or imminent use of force"). See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 131(b), at 76, n.16
(citing statutes).
53. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 131(c), at 78.
54. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 108 (West 1988) (person may use deadly force
if he reasonably believes aggressor is "about to use" deadly force).
55. TENN. CODE ANN. S 38-2-103 (Michie 1991).
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person may use force to resist it. Instead, the Code requires that
the defensive force a person uses be "immediately necessary ...
[to resist] force by such other person on the present occasion." -6
Some states have adopted this language in their own criminal
codes. 57 The Code's language shifts the temporal focus from the
imminence of harm to the actual need for the actor to use force
at the time he used it. But as a practical matter, the harm's
temporal proximity - that is, the harm's "imminence" - would
still be an important factor to consider to determine if force is
immediately necessary. A temporally removed harm would likely
call for less "immediate" action than an imminent harm.
Some temporal limitation on the use of force is necessary.
Using force whenever it appears someone may do some harm to
another in the future, or even at the first inkling that force is
appropriate, may effectively thwart a possible attack; but allow-
ing force too early deprives the potential aggressor of a chance
to change his mind and abate the danger himself.58 It is for that
reason that killing an abortionist on the golf course or at home
while mowing his lawn would not and should not be legally
justified. But one could argue whether a standard such as "im-
minence" is necessary or even useful. The term "necessary" itself
implies a temporal limitation; if a person can wait before acting
without increasing the risk, his action at the earlier time is not
necessary.
In fact, too strict a temporal limitation could increase the
danger to the aggressor's victim and decrease the chance that
intervention will be effective.59 Returning to Baker and Able,
suppose that Baker hears Able yell at his son, "I'll kill you as
soon as I get my gun." The gun is lying fifteen feet from Able,
and Baker reasonably concludes: Able will carry out his threat;
Able's son cannot escape before Able gets the gun (even with
Baker's help); Baker himself cannot get the gun before Able can;
and the only way to prevent an attack on Able's son is to use
56. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.04(1).
57. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, S 464 (Michie 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. S 703-
304 (1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.04, cmt. 2(c) n.15.
58. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 124(f), at 58 (noting that the virtue of a less
restrictive temporal limitation is that it allows early intervention, but that the virtue of
a more restrictive standard is that it "allows time for the apparent threat to abate itself
before justifying conduct to prevent it"); see also id. S 131(c), at 79; id. S 121(a), at 4-5
n.5.
59. See id. S 124(f), at 58.
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force on Able to prevent it. Should Baker have to wait until Able
is pointing the gun at his son, or should he be able to use force
against Able to prevent Able from getting his gun in the first
place? If Baker must wait, the danger to Able's son as well as
to Baker himself will increase dramatically. This hardly seems
an appropriate result.
Under the Model Penal Code's formulation, Baker should be
able to use force because he reasonably believes that using force
is immediately necessary to stop Able from killing his son "on
the present occasion.'' 60 But even the "imminence" or "about to"
standards should have enough elasticity to allow Baker to use
force against Able to prevent him from getting his gun. Florida,
for instance, has defined "imminent" as "near at hand, mediate
rather than immediate, close rather than touching. '61 Certainly,
it is reasonable to think that the harm to Able's son is "near at
hand" and "close." And it would seem strange in that situation
to say that a person could not reasonably believe that Able was
"about to" kill his son.
Similarly, a person reasonably could believe that the deaths
of unborn children scheduled to be aborted on any given day are
"close at hand" when a known abortionist pulls up to an abortuary
entrance on a day abortions are scheduled. The district court in
Florida that heard Paul Hill's federal prosecution recognized this
when, in considering whether Hill could raise a necessity defense,
it ruled that "injuring or interfering with the [abortion] provider
could be an action taken to avert the imminent peril of the
abortion being performed. 6 2 This is not to say that it could not
be possible that the abortionist was going to his office for any
number of other reasons, including to pick up his belongings to
leave, never to perform abortions again, a possibility which
presents both moral and prudential reasons for not shooting. But
the relevant standard in assessing necessity is the defendant's
60. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.04, cmt. 2(c), at 39-40, which notes as an
example that an actor may "use defensive force to prevent an assailant from summoning
reinforcements if he believes it is necessary" to prevent an attack by overwhelming
numbers, so long as he believes the attack will occur on the present occasion and not at
some future time.
61. Scholl v. State, 115 So. 43, 44 (Fla. 1928). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 676
(5th ed. 1979) (giving the same definition for "imminent").
62. United States v. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 1994) (order granting
the government's motion in limine). The court ruled that Hill could probably raise a
necessity defense at trial if he proffered evidence to support the defense's elements. But
the court granted the government's motion in limine concerning the defense because Hill
had not proffered any such evidence.
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belief; if a person has made his living for years doing abortions
and has given no indication of any intention to quit, it is reason-
able to believe that when he arrives at the abortuary at the
start of a normal "business" day, he is arriving to do abortions.
But even if a person could reasonably believe abortions are
imminent, that does not necessarily mean that he could reason-
ably believe that killing the abortionist outside the abortuary is
necessary to prevent those imminent abortions. That depends
also on whether the amount of force used was necessary, which
in turn depends on whether the actor reasonably believed he
could not prevent the harm the abortionist was threatening by
any less drastic means. For example, if a karate expert can
thwart an attack by using non-deadly martial arts techniques
rather than pulling out a gun and shooting the attacker, he will
not be justified in shooting.63
It follows from this principle that the actor must use the
least drastic means necessary, and that the actor is not justified
in breaking the law to prevent a harm if there are legal alter-
natives available to him to prevent the harm; in other words,
illegal action is not necessary if the actor has "a chance both to
refuse to do the criminal act and also avoid the threatened
harm."64 This principle has developed in cases where defendants
have invoked the general choice of evils defense to justify actions
other than homicide,65 but it is relevant to the defense of others
justification because it really is just a part of the necessity
principle underlying that justification. If a person has reasonable
legal alternatives to avoid a harm, breaking the law is not
63. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 133, at 103. A defense of others situation may
become complicated by the requirement in some jurisdictions that an actor may only use
force to defend a third person to the extent the third person could use force to defend
himself. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.05(1)(b) (actor may use force if "under the
circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the person he seeks to protect would be
justified in using such protective force"); see also ROBINSON, supra note 37, S 133, at 103
& n.3. Under this view, if the karate expert is being attacked, a person who knows that
the karate expert could use martial arts to defend himself would be privileged to use
karate, but could not use any force greater than that. Given that an unborn child has no
special skills with which to protect itself, this complication should not be relevant in the
context of force used to prevent an abortion.
64. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (quoting W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 379 (1972)); see also United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d
1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982).
65. For example, in Bailey, prisoners who had escaped from jail argued that their
escape was necessary because of dangerous conditions at the jail. 444 U.S. at 398. The
Court held that even if the defendants' initial escape was justified, their continued
absence was not because they produced no evidence to show they attempted to turn
themselves in to authorities as soon as the original necessity abated. Id. at 412-13.
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necessary. 66 For example, if Charlie is surrounded by sixteen
police officers, and sees one person begin to beat up another
person, Charlie likely could call on the officers present to protect
the victim rather than rushing in and assaulting the attacker
himself. Thus, Charlie's bypassing the officers and rushing to the
victim's defense would not be necessary.
It also follows from the principle that an illegal act is
justified only if necessary- that is, a "causal relationship" must
exist between the actor's use of force and the avoidance of the
threatened harm 7 Again, the notion is simple: if a person's action
cannot prevent the harm, that action certainly cannot be neces-
sary to prevent the harm.
Could a defendant reasonably argue that killing an abortion-
ist was necessary to save unborn babies from death? A number
of reported cases have analyzed the general choice of evils
defense in cases involving trespasses at abortuaries that were
designed to prevent abortions at those abortuaries." Generally,
those cases have rejected the argument that the trespasses were
necessary, 69 but the legal reasoning in those cases on the neces-
sity question is flawed.
66. See id. at 411.
67. See Gant, 691 F.2d at 1164.
68. See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1992); Northeast Women's
Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350-52 (3d Cir. 1989); Cleveland v. Municipality
of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073 (Alaska 1981); Bird v. Municipality of Anchorage, 787 P.2d
119 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990); State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); City of
St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Buckley v. City of Falls Church,
371 S.E.2d 827 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211, 212-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Berquist, 608
N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Stiso, 416 N.E.2d 1209 (II. App. Ct. 1981);
Erlandson v. State, 763 S.W.2d 845, 852 (Tex. App. Ct. 1988); Sigma Reproductive Health
Ctr. v. State, 467 A.2d 483, 484 (Md. 1983).
69. All the cases cited in note 68 rejected the necessity defense. No reported
appellate court case has accepted the necessity defense in an abortuary trespass case.
However, several trial courts have acquitted abortuary trespassers based on the necessity
defense. See, e.g., City of Wichita v. Tilson, No. 91 MC 108 (18th Dist. Ct., Sedgwick
County, Kansas, July 20, 1992); City of St. Louis v. Petersen, No. 808-00002 (Cir. Ct. Mo.
March 28, 1980); County of Fairfax v. Gaetano, No. 13974 (Fairfax County Va. Oct 17,
1977). See also United States v. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV (N.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 1994) (holding
necessity could be a defense for Paul Hill in his federal FACE prosecution, but granting
the government's motion in limine to exclude the defense because Hill had not proffered
any evidence to support the defense); People v. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (City Ct. 1988)
(allowing necessity defense only if defendants could prove abortions were committed after
first trimester). Judges in two trespass cases also have opined that necessity can be a
valid defense in some trespass cases. See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631
P.2d at 1086 n.1 (Dimond, Senior Judge, concurring) (necessity could justify trespass in
a case where a husband is attempting to prevent his wife from having an abortion); City
of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d at 178-79 (Pudlowski, J., dissenting).
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Several of the cases rejecting the necessity defense for
abortuary trespassers have held that the trespassers could not
reasonably have believed that their trespassing could prevent
abortions.70 The Alaska Supreme Court in Cleveland likened abor-
tuary trespassers to anti-war and anti-nuclear demonstrators who
trespass to dramatize their beliefs. 71 Courts consistently have
denied the necessity defense to anti-war and anti-nuclear dem-
onstrators because those demonstrators could not reasonably
have thought that their actions would result in cessation of war
or the use of nuclear weapons. 72 For example, a person trespass-
ing onto the property of a plant that produces bombshell casings
can hardly think his action will prevent the use of nuclear
weapons. Besides, such a trespass is directed at a temporally
remote threat of harm.73
But unlike anti-war and anti-nuclear protestors, abortuary
trespassers are not acting to prevent some remote harm at some
future time. Instead, abortuary trespassers are seeking to pre-
vent abortions on the day of their trespass by actually blocking
access to the clinics. As the judge in Hill's federal prosecution
sensibly noted, "[I]t is possible to hold a reasonable belief that
injuring or interfering with abortion providers will prevent at
least one or some abortions from occurring. 74 Some courts have
reasoned that blocking an abortuary could only temporarily halt
abortions. The trespassers eventually would be removed; women
could reschedule their appointments or go to another abortuary;
and eventually "society's normal operations would reassert them-
selves. 7 5 This reasoning begs the question whether it was rea-
sonable to think trespassing at an abortion clinic would actually
prevent abortions at that clinic on the day of the trespass. An
attacker may come back and finish his work some other time;
somebody else may harm the victim the very same day. But that
does not mean a person is not legally justified in directly resisting
a known aggressor at the time of his aggression. An abortuary
70. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1352; Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1079-80; Bird, 787 P.2d at
121-22; Wall, 539 A.2d at 1329.
71. 631 P.2d at 1079.
72. See cases cited in Rice, supra note 9, at 18 n.15 and United States v. Hill, No.
94-03118-RV, slip op. at 4. But see People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Crim. Ct. 1991)
(allowing necessity defense for defendants who blocked a bridge to protest opening a
lane to automobile traffic that previously had been reserved for pedestrians and bicycles).
73. See Commonwealth v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1985).
74. United States v. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV, slip op. at 5.
75. Cleveland, 631 P.2d at 1080; see Wall, 539 A.2d at 1324; McMonagle, 868 F.2d at
1352.
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trespasser should at least be allowed to present evidence to show
that abortions were to be done at the abortuary that day, that
his trespass was designed to prevent those abortions, and that
it was reasonable to believe that the trespass would prevent one
or more abortions (for example, by presenting evidence of suc-
cessful rescue efforts in the past, or evidence that the trespass
actually prevented one or more women from having scheduled
abortions).
Courts also have found that abortuary trespassers had other
legal means available to them to protest or to try to stop
abortions, such as lobbying to change abortion laws and com-
municating with women to persuade them not to have abortions;
therefore, those courts held, breaking the law was not necessary. 78
This may be so if the abortuary trespassers were doing nothing
but protesting and could not reasonably believe they could ac-
tually prevent abortions on the day of the trespass. But, as the
court in Hill's federal prosecution noted, "a lurking question may
remain as to whether such legal alternatives are viable alterna-
tives to [prevent] the perceived imminent harm. 77 Certainly one
can doubt that lobbying to change abortion laws or the Consti-
tution some time in the future will actually prevent abortions
that are scheduled today at a particular abortuary. And while
protestors and sidewalk counselors (that is, people who counsel
pregnant women outside abortuaries that abortion is wrong, that
alternatives to abortion exist, and that the women should not
and need not have their unborn children killed) may persuade
some women not to have abortions, it could be reasonable to
believe that not all women have been or will be persuaded, and
that at least some of the abortions planned on any given day are
likely to proceed as scheduled.
A defendant raising a necessity defense may demonstrate
that he has no reasonable legal alternative to his illegal action
by showing "that he actually tried the alternative or had no time
to try it, or that a history of futile attempts revealed the
illusionary benefit of the alternative.178 If an abortuary trespasser
who reasonably believed his trespass could prevent abortions at
the abortuary can present evidence to show that he exhausted
available legal alternatives or that past experience led him to
76. See, e.g., McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1352; Zal, 968 F.2d at 929; Cleveland, 631 P.2d
at 1079-80; Wall, 539 A.2d at 1329; Buckley, 371 S.E.2d at 828.
77. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV, slip op. at 7.
78. United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982).
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believe such alternatives would be futile, he should not be pre-
vented from arguing to a jury that his trespass was necessary.
Trespassing at or blocking an abortuary is one thing; homi-
cide is another. Could a defendant demonstrate that killing the
abortionist was necessary to prevent scheduled abortions? As
noted earlier, one could reasonably believe that when a known
abortionist pulls up to the abortuary entrance, the deaths of the
unborn children are "close at hand" or, in other words, "immi-
nent" or "about to occur." One also could reasonably believe that
some action to prevent the abortionist from doing his work would
be "immediately necessary."7 9 Theoretically, it is possible that
the abortionist's killer could present evidence to show he reason-
ably believed he could not have gotten any closer to the abor-
tionist in time or place than he did, and that barring some action
at that time to prevent the abortionist from entering the abor-
tuary, the abortionist would enter and commit abortions.
The defendant should have no problem showing his reason-
able belief that a "direct causal connection" existed between
shooting the abortionist and preventing scheduled abortions. In-
deed, it is difficult to imagine a more direct connection-a dead
abortionist cannot perform abortions. As for alternative legal
means of preventing those abortions, the killer could make the
same arguments the trespassers could make. There is no reason
why it would be impossible for the killer to show that he had
tried other legal means or that he knew those means had turned
out to be futile in the past.
Assuming the defendant can show that he reasonably be-
lieved some action was necessary to prevent the abortionist from
committing abortions that day, a more difficult question arises:
Can the defendant show that he reasonably believed that he
could only stop the abortionist by killing him? In asking this
question, we assume a case in which the defendant has used
force specifically designed to kill the abortionist. Such was the
case in the Griffin and Hill cases (both of which involved shoot-
ings), and it is reasonable to assume that any future case (if there
ever is such a case) will involve direct intentional killing rather
than a use of force that was not designed to kill but went awry.
The judge in Hill's federal prosecution found that Hill con-
ceivably could have raised a necessity defense if Hill would have
79. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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presented evidence to support the defense. But the judge never
considered whether Hill could have used less drastic means than
killing to prevent the abortions that were scheduled to take place
at the abortuary. The judge did consider whether Hill could
reasonably believe that he had no available legal alternatives,
but that is only part of the necessity analysis. It is also essential
to consider whether Hill reasonably believed that no alternatives
- legal or illegal - were available. This is so because, as noted,
killing the abortionist would not have been necessary if less
drastic means (even if illegal) would have sufficed to prevent the
abortions, just as Baker's killing Able would not be necessary if
Baker could save Able's son by tackling Able.
It is not difficult to think of several alternative means short
of killing the abortionist to prevent abortions at an abortuary.
Blockading the abortuary and its examining rooms is one example;
breaking into the abortuary and destroying the instruments of
death is another. One could threaten the abortionist - "Leave,
or I will shoot you." One also could break the abortionist's hands
or arms, or shoot to wound rather than to kill.80
Like shooting to kill, shooting to wound or breaking the
abortionist's hands or arms would constitute deadly force. Deadly
force generally is force that a person knows will cause, or is
likely to cause, death or serious bodily harm."1 But there are
degrees of deadly force. Shooting somebody and hitting him with
a baseball bat with enough force to break his leg are both deadly
force, but few would suggest that shooting a person is not greater
force than hitting a person with a bat. Courts have noted this
distinction in analyzing defense of others claims. In Fersner v.
United States,82 the court held that even if the defendant was
entitled to use deadly force to defend a friend who was being
kicked, stomped, and beaten, he could not, as a matter of law,
reasonably have believed that striking the aggressor in the head
with the sharp side of a hatchet with enough force to kill him
80. We are not recommending these actions; we are only pointing out that actions
less drastic than killing an abortionist may be available to prevent abortions, even if
those less drastic actions are themselves illegal. As a matter of moral doctrine, it is
objectively wrong to injure another person intentionally, just as it is to kill. See infra
part II. Moreover, all these actions would potentially expose the actor to federal prose-
cution and substantial criminal and civil penalties under FACE (see 18 U.S.C. S 248(a)-(c)
as well as prosecution for various state law offenses).
81. See MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.11(2); N. Y. PENAL LAW S 10.00(11); Fersner v.
United States, 482 A.2d 387, 392 (D.C. App. 1984).
82. 482 A.2d 387 (D.C. App. 1984).
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was necessary to defend his friend. The court reasoned that the
defendant "obviously" could have thwarted the attack on his
friend by using a lesser degree of deadly force designed to injure
rather than kill, such as striking the aggressor elsewhere on his
body with the hatchet's blunt side.83
Despite the likely availability of less drastic (if still illegal)
means, it is conceivable that a defendant could show he reason-
ably believed killing the abortionist was necessary. One argument
the defendant should not be able to make is that killing the
abortionist, rather than temporarily disabling him, was the only
way to permanently prevent the abortionist from doing abortions.
This argument ignores any limitation on the temporal proximity
between the defendant's use of force and the threatened harm.
Although, as we have seen, the requirements that the harm be
"imminent" or that the use of force be "immediately necessary"
have some elasticity and do not necessarily require a defender
to wait until the last possible moment to use force, the law must
draw a line somewhere. To allow force to prevent harms contem-
plated to occur days, weeks, or months in the future would
stretch the concepts of imminence and immediate necessity, and
even unadorned necessity, beyond the breaking point. Allowing
the defendant to argue that killing rather than some less drastic
use of force was necessary because it would permanently disable
the abortionist is to allow the defendant to argue that his action
was necessary because it would prevent harms that were to
occur far in the future. If the law recognized that principle, it
should also allow open season to kill abortionists anywhere, at
any time, so long as the killers could show that they reasonably
believed they had no other opportunity to stop the abortionist
from permanently doing abortions. This result is neither legally
nor morally justified. 4
The discussion appears to leave little room to argue that
killing an abortionist could be necessary to prevent the abortions
he is about to perform. But reasonable belief in necessity, not
actual necessity, is the question, and a defendant might be able
to prove that he reasonably believed such drastic action was
necessary. For example, the defendant could present evidence
showing that he previously had participated in or knew about
abortuary blockades and that a blockade would not have been
effective to prevent all the day's scheduled abortions because of
83. Id. at 393.
84. See infra part II.
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a lack of a sufficient number of participants, or some other
reason.8 5 He conceivably could present evidence that circum-
stances prevented him from getting close enough to the abor-
tionist to threaten the abortionist or physically disable him without
shooting. And he could present evidence that the only opportunity
he had to shoot at the abortionist was, for example, an oppor-
tunity to shoot at his head - to shoot to kill. It is possible the
defendant could show that if he did not take that opportunity,
he reasonably believed that scheduled abortions would take place
inside the abortuary; or, in other words, if he did not shoot to
kill, unborn children surely would die that day. If the defendant
could produce this type of evidence, a fact finder conceivably
could find that the defendant reasonably believed that shooting
the abortionist, drastic as it was, was necessary to prevent the
abortionist from taking unborn lives by abortion.
3. Other Obstacles to Raising the Defense of Others
Justification.
Assuming that a defendant could show that he reasonably
believed that killing the abortionist as he arrived at the abortuary
was necessary to save the lives of the babies to be aborted that
day (and that a court would ever allow a defendant to make such
a showing), the defendant would face several other significant
hurdles in asserting a defense of others justification. All these
hurdles essentially revolve around the Supreme Court's holdings
in its abortion cases that the unborn child is not a person entitled
85. Cases such as Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage and Commonwealth v. Wall
have held that a blockade participant could not prove that he could reasonably believe
that trespassing at the abortuary could effectively prevent abortions. See 631 P.2d at
1080; 539 A.2d at 1329. These cases unwittingly seem to suggest that the next person
who wants to prevent abortions should perhaps use a more forceful means of accomplishing
his purpose.
86. Paul Hill killed an abortionist. He also killed the abortionist's escort and
wounded the escort's wife, neither of whom was an abortionist. Even if Hill could establish
that it was necessary to kill the abortionist, it is difficult to believe that he could prove
that killing the escort or wounding the escort's wife was justified. The escort was not
an abortionist; he could not perform abortions; without the abortionist, the abortuary
could not function even with the escort alive. No matter what one may think of the
escort's participation in the evil of abortion, killing the escort smacks of cold-blooded
execution, not of an act designed to save the lives of unborn children. Only duly appointed
agents of the state have the legal or moral right to execute any person for committing
a crime. See infra part II; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 178-79 (execution is
justifiable homicide if done by one who has the legal duty to do so; otherwise, "wantonly
to kill the greatest of malefactors ... is murder.").
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to Fourteenth Amendment protection and that the state may not
prohibit most abortions because of a woman's "right" to have an
abortion.
a. Roe, Casey, and the question of personhood
Most formulations of the defense of others justification pro-
vide that a person may use force to defend another person.8 7 As
we already have noted, the Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade
that the unborn child is not a person for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. One could argue that this ruling settles the
question of whether a defense of others justification is available
for a defendant who kills an abortionist. But most defense of
others statutes do not necessarily state that one may "use force
to defend a person as that term is used in the fourteenth amendment
as defined by Roe v. Wade." The point is that "person" can mean
any number of different things, and the word "person" in a
formulation of a defense of others justification need not be limited
as it was in Roe; it could include the unborn child. ss
A "person" in general usage is "a human being...."9 By
this definition, the unborn child definitely qualifies as a person.
Roe v. Wade, as we have noted, did not decide that the unborn
child is not a human being; instead, Roe declined to answer this
question.90 "[T]he 'scientific' fact, which everyone really knows,
that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether
intra-or-extra uterine until death"91 has been recognized even by
abortion proponents.92 Logic and a plethora of data support the
87. See e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.05(1) (use of force is "justifiable to protect a
third person"); ALA. CODE S 13-A-3-23 (Michie 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14:22 (West
1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A S 108 (West 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW S 35.15 (McKinney
1987). Some state statutes provide for use of force in defense of "another." See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. S 776.012 (West 1993), which provides that "[a] person is justified in the use
of force, ... against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that
such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another .... (emphasis added). The object
of this sentence - "another" - relates back to the subject - "person" - thus making
it reasonable to conclude that "another" means "another person."
88. But see Boushey v. State, 804 S.W.2d 148, 150, 151 (Tex. App. 1990) (Texas
Penal Code defines person as an "individual, corporation, or association" and an "individ-
ual" as "a human being who has been born and is alive;" therefore, an unborn child is
not a person for purposes of defense of others justification).
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (5th ed. 1979).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16.
91. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
92. Id.
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unborn child's membership in the human species from the time
of conception. 93 The assertion that the unborn is not human from
conception is not a scientifically supportable statement of fact
but is merely a value judgment concerning which humans the
law should protect, a statement that human beings begin to have
"worth" only at some arbitrarily chosen time.94
To interpret "person" in the defense of others justification
in its normal sense - that is, as including any living human
being - would be consistent with the rationale apparent from
the face of these formulations of that justification, which is to
protect human life. A corporation, for legal purposes, generally
is a "person";95 yet, it would be strange to think of somebody
using physical force to injure or "kill" a corporation. True, some-
body could burglarize or attempt arson on a corporation's prop-
erty, or otherwise damage a corporation's property, actions which
in a sense would injure the corporation and could perhaps even
"kill" the corporation by forcing it out of existence. But a separate
justification exists to allow a person to use force to protect
property.96 Even in that case, deadly force is generally proper
only when a serious threat to a human life exists - that is,
"where the unlawful interference with property is accompanied
by a threat of deadly force (in which case it is proper to use
deadly force in self-defense), or where the unlawful interference
[with property] involves an invasion of an occupied dwelling house
under circumstances causing the defender reasonably to believe
that the invader intends to commit a felony therein or to do
serious bodily harm to its occupants." 97
Interpreting the word "person" in its normal sense also
would be consistent with protection the unborn child receives in
other areas of the law. The unborn child "has been accorded legal
status for various purposes in equity, criminal law, property law,
93. See supra sources cited at note 12; see also supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
text.
94. See Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 840 (1973). For a thoughtful discussion of the arbitrariness and
scientific invalidity of assigning standing for the recognition of individual rights at any
point other than fertilization (i.e., the point at which the nuclei of the sperm and ovum
unite to form a biologically distinct, genetically unique, living organism), see John J.
Coleman III, Roe v. Wade: A Retrospective Look at a Judicial Oxymoron, 29 ST. Louis U.
L. J. 7, 16-27 (1984).
95. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (corporation is a
person for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause).
96. See MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.06; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.9.
97. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.9, at 465.
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and tort law."98 For example, almost all states allow a child to
recover for prenatal injuries he received after viability, and allow
recovery for wrongful death if the child is born alive and then
dies.99 A majority of states have eliminated the requirement that
a child be born alive before his parents may recover for wrongful
death, 100 and most courts, "when actually faced with the issue
for decision," have allowed recovery for injuries a child received
before viability. 10 1 This trend is consistent with the common law,
which, with "one relatively short-lived aberration" regarded the
unborn child as "a human being in esse in all areas of law except
for the criminal law where the exigencies of proof give rise to
the ... dichotomy" between an unborn child before and after
quickening.10 2
Courts also have ordered women to undergo medical proce-
dures to protect their unborn children's lives. For example, in
Estate of Warner, 103 an Illinois court ordered a Jehovah's Witness
woman to undergo blood transfusions to save her unborn child's
life, despite her religious objections and even though the child
was not viable at the time of the court's order. 10 4 Warner was a
98. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, S 55, at 368.
99. Id.; see also STUART M. SPEISER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & JUANITA M. MADOLE,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY S 4:33, at 180-82 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter
WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY).
100. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, S 55, at 369-70; WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY,
supra note 99, S 4:35, at 187-92.
101. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, S 55, at 368-69. The viability rule is a legal
anachronism: the authors of PROSSER ON TORTS, in espousing recovery for injuries to an
unborn baby inflicted before viability, have noted that "if existence at the time of the
tortious act is necessary, medical authority has long recognized that an unborn child is
in existence from the moment of conception," and that "lviability of course does not
affect the question of the legal existence of the unborn ... and it is a most unsatisfactory
criterion, since it is a relative matter ...... Id. S 55, at 367, 369.
102. See Byrn, supra note 94, at 843 n.224. As Professor Byrn notes, before the mid-
1800s, criminal law commonly made a distinction between abortions done before and after
the child quickened (that is when the mother could feel the child move). The common law
history is complex, but the best explanation for the distinction is that prosecuting
abortions performed before quickening presented serious problems of proof, not that
abortion at any time was any kind of common law "right." See generally id. at 815-27. As
Dr. Nathanson has noted, "It's not surprising ... that the common law permitted abortion
without penalty before quickening ... it was simply that one could not even be sure a
woman was pregnant until that event." NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 119. As we shall
discuss later, after the mid-1800s, states commonly prohibited abortion at all stages of
pregnancy. See infra notes 186-195 and accompanying text.
103. No. 71 P 3681 (Cook County, Ill. Cir. Ct., May 5, 1971), cited in Byrn, supra
note 94, at 846-47.
104. See Byrn, supra note 94, at 846. Other pre-Doe cases also had ordered women
to undergo blood transfusions to save their unborn children. See id. at 845-46 (citing
Hoerner v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961) and Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A,2d 537 (N.J. 1964)).
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pre-Roe case. Even after Roe, courts have ordered women to
undergo medical treatment to save their unborn children. In In
re A.C.,105 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered
doctors to perform a Caesarian section on a woman dying of
cancer. The mother and child both ultimately died.06 But despite
that fact, and despite the fact that the court of appeals subse-
quently vacated its decision, In re A.C. shows that even after
Roe, courts consider the unborn child an entity worthy of legal
protection. This at least implies a recognition of the unborn's
humanity, no matter how courts might try to say otherwise;
courts do not order people to undergo invasive surgical proce-
dures to save their property.
Cases like In re A.C. and tort cases allowing recovery for
prenatal injuries point to gaping anomalies within the law, anom-
alies that exist thanks to the Supreme Court's abortion jurispru-
dence. On the one hand, a woman is free (subject only to token
restrictions) to have her unborn child killed any time before it
is viable, and any time after viability if she can show it is
necessary to protect her "health," as the Supreme Court has
sweepingly defined that term. On the other hand, if somebody
injures that unborn child, the child may recover for those injuries
in many states; and, if the child's life is in danger, the state may
order the woman to undergo medical treatment to save the child,
even though the woman could subsequently decide to abort the
child.
Perhaps most anomalous is the way the law treats inten-
tionally killing an unborn child except when done by a doctor at
the mother's behest. In St. Petersburg, Florida, an abortuary
turned away a nineteen-year-old girl who was six months preg-
nant because she did not have the $1,300 to $1,800 necessary to
pay for a late-term abortion. 10 7 The girl, desperate to abort, fired
a pistol into the right side of her womb, shooting her baby in
the wrist. The baby was born by emergency Caesarian section,
105. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
106. 533 A.2d at 611.
107. Woman Who Shot Fetus to Abort Charged With Murder, American Political
Network Abortion Report, Sept. 12, 1994, available in Lexis, Nexis library, News file.
This sad episode exposes the abortion industry for what it is - a cold-hearted, cold-
blooded business, concerned more with profits than with the alleged welfare of the women
for whom the industry ostensibly exists. Dr. Bernard Nathanson (who, having been
director of one of the largest abortuaries in the United States is eminently qualified to
speak to the matter) estimated that as far back as 1980, the gross income of the abortion
industry was $500,000,000, with approximately $250 to $300,000,000 of that going to the
abortionists. See NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 162-63.
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but died less than one month later from complications of the
premature birth.108 The mother was charged with third-degree
murder, and given that she killed an innocent human being, this
was an appropriate charge. But in light of Roe and its progeny,
one may reasonably wonder whether the more proper charge
should have been practicing medicine without a license; after all,
the mother was only doing what the Supreme Court in Roe and
its progeny said she had a right to do.1 9
In People v. Davis,110 the California Supreme Court recently
held that killing a seven-week-old unborn child could constitute
murder (and potentially subject the killer to the death penalty)
under a California murder statute which read: "Murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice afore-
thought."1 " ' Previous California Court of Appeals cases had held
that a person committed murder only when he killed a viable
fetus.112 These holdings were based on the view that "implicit in
[Roe v.] Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional
law, destruction of a non-viable fetus is not a taking of human
life." Thus, "one cannot destroy independent human life prior to
the time it has come into existence." 13
The California Supreme Court overruled these court of ap-
peals cases. Taking the murder statute at face value, the supreme
court noted that the statute did not refer to viability. According
108. Woman Who Shot Fetus Charged With Murder, supra note 107.
109. See William Raspberry, A Case of Abortion by Gunshot, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
1994, at A21.
110. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
111. Id. at 593; see Cal. Pena( Code S 187(a) (West 1988).
112. See People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976); People v. Apodaca, 142
Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978); People v. Smith, 234 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987).
113. People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502 (quoted in Davis, 872 P.2d at 595). The
court of appeals in Smith was wrong, of course, in concluding that Roe had decided that
destroying a nonviable unborn child was not a taking of human life. As we already have
noted, Roe did not decide the unborn child was not human; it decided only that it was
not a "person" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. The Smith court also supported its
conclusion that there was no human life to take before viability by equating "human life"
with the being's ability to live independently. Thus, until viability, which is the point at
which the unborn theoretically can live outside the womb, the unborn is not human and
therefore not worthy of protection. This reasoning is specious. A viable unborn child -
and a newborn baby, or many elderly people for that matter - is no more capable of
"independent" existence than a non-viable unborn child. If the ability to live independently
is the criteria for entitlement to legal protection. infants, small children, and many elderly
people should be no more worthy of legal protection than the unborn. Sadly, this is the
direction in which our culture is moving. See generally FOURNIER, supra note 33, at 37-60
(noting the relation of the abortion mentality to increasing incidents of infanticide,
euthanasia, and assisted suicide).
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to the court, Roe v. Wade did not require that any viability
requirement be read into the statute. Even the United States
Supreme Court's abortion cases recognized that the state has an
interest in protecting what those cases referred to as "potential
human life," before viability as well as after.114 Roe and its
progeny were only concerned with when that interest was suf-
ficiently strong to override the woman's liberty or privacy inter-
est in having an abortion. The California Supreme Court reasoned
that where the woman's privacy or liberty interest is not at
stake, nothing in Roe or its progeny prevents a state from
protecting the unborn child at any stage of development. 15
Fetal homicide cases graphically illustrate the absurdity in
our legal regime that declares abortion a fundamental right but
nevertheless purports to assign some type of protection to the
abortion's object. Suppose Sue, who is pregnant and on her way
to have an abortion, is accosted by Baker across the street from
the abortuary where she was headed. Baker demands Sue's purse;
when she hesitates, Baker shoots her in the abdomen. The shoot-
ing causes Sue to give birth prematurely, and the baby dies
because of the complications of that premature birth.
The law would call Baker a murderer, and rightly so. In
California, Baker could even be put to death for his crime. But
if Sue had walked across the street, another person could have
done to her unborn child what Baker did (and perhaps even less
humanely), free from any meaningful restriction by the state.
The law would not call that person a murderer; it would call him
a "doctor." And that person would not be subject to death for
killing Sue's child and thousands of other unborn children; in-
stead, he would continue to make a substantial living from his
killing.
114. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992), in which the
Court emphasized that Roe had "recognized the State's 'important and legitimate interest
in protecting the potentiality of human life."' (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 162). The Court
in Casey noted that this interest existed throughout pregnancy, and although it did not
become strong enough to override the woman's "liberty" to abort until viability (subject,
of course, to the toothless "life or health" exception of Doe v. Bolton), it did justify some
restrictions on abortion that did not create an "undue burden" on the right to abort. See
generally 112 S. Ct. at 2817-21.
115. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597-99. Other states' courts also have employed essentially
the same reasoning to hold that Roe and its progeny do not prevent a state from
prosecuting an unborn child's killer for murder, even if the child was not yet capable of
living outside the womb. See State v. Merril, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990); People v.
Yord, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (fIl. 1991).
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Putting this absurdity aside, the fetal homicide cases (along
with the tort cases and the cases involving court-ordered medical
care to save the unborn child's life) do demonstrate that the
Supreme Court's abortion cases do not prohibit states from
meaningfully protecting the unborn child where that protection
does not conflict with the woman's right to have an abortion.
11 6
Certainly, the difference in treatment that Baker and the abor-
tionist would receive cannot be accounted for entirely by the fact
that Baker inflicted injury on Sue as well as her child. Neither
attempted murders nor deprivations of property or privacy rights
are normally punishable by death, and current Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence probably would not allow the death penalty
for these offenses. 17 Instead, the law, despite Roe, must implicitly
recognize something about the unborn child that makes it worthy
of protection in the same way that any other human being is
worthy of protection. The Supreme Court's abortion cases simply
do not speak to the matter of how states may protect the unborn
child when that protection does not conflict with the woman's
right to abort, other than to say the state has an interest in
protecting the unborn's life. Likewise, the Supreme Court's abor-
tion cases do not speak to the actions a private citizen may take
to protect the unborn child, or the defenses that citizen may
raise if criminally prosecuted for his acts. Moreover, those cases
do not define the word "person" in all contexts. Thus, one could
argue that the Supreme Court's abortion cases do not prevent a
state from defining "person" in its defense of others statute to
include unborn children, thus making that defense potentially
available to somebody who kills an abortionist in the belief that
the killing was necessary to save unborn children who were
about to die at the abortionist's hands.
b. State action
Abortion proponents would object that recognizing the de-
fense of others justification for the abortionist's killer does conflict
116. The California murder statute makes a specific exception for legal abortion. See
Davis, 872 P.2d at 594 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE S 187(b)).
117. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) in which the Court found that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited states from imposing the death penalty for rape even
though the plurality opinion acknowledged that rape is "highly reprehensible" and "[s]hort
of homicide ... is 'the ultimate violation of self,"' and the defendant, at the time he
committed the rape, was an escaped convict serving a life sentence for murder, rape,
and various other serious crimes. See id. at 587, 597 (citations omitted). The dissent in
Coker opined that the decision implied that "the death penalty may be properly imposed
only as to crimes resulting in the death of the victim." Id. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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with the woman's right to have an abortion by giving a private
citizen a veto over a woman's decision to abort. Language in
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth,"8 may seem to sup-
port that position. In Danforth, the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional a state-imposed requirement that a woman obtain her
husband's written consent before having an abortion during the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy. The Court also held unconsti-
tutional a state-imposed requirement that a minor obtain one of
her parents' consent before having an abortion. 119 In holding these
requirements unconstitutional, the Court noted that "since the
state cannot regulate or proscribe abortion ... the state cannot
delegate authority to any particular person ... to prevent abor-
tion .... "120
Some courts in abortuary trespass cases have reasoned that
to allow a necessity defense in those cases would be to allow the
state to delegate a veto power to strangers that it could not
delegate to a woman's spouse. By doing so, the argument goes,
the state itself would be imposing an impermissible restriction
on a woman's decision to have an abortion. 21 This reasoning
ignores the well-recognized dichotomy between individual and
state action, and the role that dichotomy plays in Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. According to the Suprpme Court, the
decision to have an abortion is a species of liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that the state may not
"deprive any person of ... liberty ... without due process of
law. . ,,122 The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation on the
state's power to act.123 Consequently, "constitutional guarantees
118. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
119. Id. at 67-75. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court also struck
down a requirement that a woman provide a signed statement that she has notified her
husband before having an abortion. 112 S. Ct. at 2826-31. Casey did, however, uphold a
parental consent requirement for minors seeking abortions because the requirement
contained an adequate procedure by which the minor could seek a court's consent for the
abortion in lieu of her parents' consent. See id. at 2832-33; see also Ohio v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506-19 (1990) (upholding Ohio law requiring notice
to one parent; law contained judicial bypass); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459-
61 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); id. at 488-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (holding that two-parent notification provision is constitutional if
accompanied by judicial bypass provision).
120. 428 U.S. at 69.
121. See Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1080-81 n.15 (Alaska
1981); State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 192 (N.D. 1991); Commonwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d
at 1325, 1330 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S1; see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-08.




of liberty ... do not apply to the actions of private entities."' 124
As the Court recognized long ago, "It is State action of a partic-
ular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment." 12 5
In Danforth, the court struck down a state-imposed require-
ment that a woman obtain another's consent before having an
abortion. The actionable violation of the woman's right to an
abortion was not the husband's preventing his wife or the parents'
preventing their daughter from having an abortion; it was, in-
stead, the fact that the state required the wife or daughter to
obtain her husband's or parent's consent. Absent the state-im-
posed requirement, a husband's preventing his wife from having
an abortion would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause no state action is involved. Likewise, a private citizen's
preventing a woman from having an abortion by blockading an
abortuary (or killing an abortionist) would not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. And even if the state did not prohibit tres-
pass (or murder) or the police failed to break up an abortuary
blockade in time to allow abortions to be done, the state would
not be violating the Due Process Clause because that clause
"generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure ... liberty ...
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.' ' 26
It would seem to follow that to allow a defendant who broke
the law to prevent abortions to raise a generally applicable
criminal defense would not constitute state infringement of the
woman's right to abort. This would be akin to the state's failure
to make trespass a crime. The court in Cleveland v. Municipality
of Anchorage, however, cited Shelley v. Kraemer 27 to support its
suggestion that allowing defendants in an abortuary trespass
case to raise a necessity defense would constitute state infringe-
ment of a woman's right to have an abortion. 128 But Shelley does
124. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991).
125. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
126. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196; Cf Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (even
though a woman has a right to an abortion, she has no right to have the state pay for
it; "[a~lthough the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against
unwarranted government interference .... it does not confer an entitlement to such
[governmental aid] as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.").
127. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
128. See 631 P.2d at 1080 n.15.
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not support that conclusion. In Shelley, the Supreme Court struck
down two courts' decisions to enforce racially discriminatory
private covenants against sellers who wished to sell their prop-
erty to blacks in violation of the covenants.129 The Supreme Court
held that while private adherence to the covenants would not
have violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 1' ° state court enforce-
ment of the covenants amounted to state action depriving the
buyers of equal protection of the laws. The Court noted that
[t]hese are not cases ... in which the States have merely
abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to im-
pose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are
cases in which the States have made available to such indi-
viduals the full coercive power of the government to deny
petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment
of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing
and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are
willing to sell.'3'
Note that Shelley involved willing buyers and sellers. Had
the state courts not interfered, no discrimination would have
occurred. The state court was not merely allowing a private
decision to discriminate, it actually was compelling the seller to
discriminate. In other words, Shelley implicitly recognized a dis-
tinction between a state court's decision to affirmatively require
conduct, and a state court's decision to deny relief to an allegedly
aggrieved party.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases also recognized this dis-
tinction. Take, for instance, Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks.132 In
Flagg Brothers, a woman storing goods in a warehouse sued to
enjoin the warehouseman from selling her property pursuant to
a New York statute allowing such a sale. 33 The woman argued
that the sale amounted to state action because the state statute
"had authorized and encouraged it." The Court scotched this
argument, holding that 'a State is responsible for the ... act of
a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the
act.' This Court, however, has never held that a State's mere
acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of
the State."' 34 The Court went on to note that "[a] judicial decision
129. 334 U.S. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
132. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
133. Id. at 151-53.
134. Id. at 164 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)); see
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to deny relief [and permit the sale] would be no less 'authorization'
or 'encouragement' of that sale .... If the mere denial of ...
judicial relief is ... [all that is required] to make the ... State
responsible for ... private acts, all private deprivations would
be converted into public acts whenever the State, for whatever
reason, denies relief ... ,"135
Recognizing the necessity defense for defendants who break
the law to prevent women from having abortions may "encour-
age" such lawbreaking, but it in no way compels the lawbreaking.
Defendants seeking to assert the necessity defense only "seek
judicial acquiescence.... ."I" Allowing these defendants to raise
this defense is no more a state deprivation of the right to an
abortion than allowing a murder defendant to raise a particular
defense is a state deprivation of the victim's right to life. Allowing
a defense merely allows the jury to deny relief to the state by
acquitting the defendant. Such an acquittal does not amount to
state action denying women the right to an abortion.137
c. Using force to defend against unlawful force.
If the defendant can adduce sufficient facts to show that
killing the abortionist was necessary and can persuade the court
that the unborn child is a "person" for purposes of the defense,
he will still run into probably the biggest obstacle to raising
defense of others as a justification for killing an abortionist -
the limitation in almost all jurisdictions' formulations of the
justification that a person may use force only to defend against
unlawful force. The Model Penal Code, for instance, provides that
a person may use force to protect himself or a third person
"against the use of unlawful force by [an aggressor]." 131 Commen-
tators agree that a person may use force only to defend others
against unlawful force. According to LaFave and Scott, "The
prevailing rule is that one is justified in using reasonable force
also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (state administrative rule requiring
a private club to comply with racially discriminatory bylaws was state action).; Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("a State normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement .. . that the choice must in law be deemed that of the state. Mere approval
of or acquiesence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient . .
135. 436 U.S. at 165.
136. Patrick G. Senftle, Comment, The Necessity Defense in Abortion Trespass Cases,
32 ST. Louis U. L. REV. 523, 543 (1987).
137. See id.; see also Debbe A. Levin, Note, Necessity as a Defense to a Charge of
Criminal Trespass at an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 514 (1979) which, although
arguing against recognizing the necessity defense in abortuary trespass cases, concedes
that recognizing the defense would not amount to state action depriving women of the
right to an abortion.
138. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.04(1); see id. S 3.05(1)(a)-(b), which deems use of force in
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in defense of another person ... when he reasonably believes
that the other [person] is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily
harm .... "139 Perkins' conclusion is similar: "The present position
[on defense of others] ... is that one may go to the defense of a
stranger if that person is the victim of an unlawful attack."14 0
Most state statutes allow the use of force only against unlawful
force. For example, Florida law allows a person to use force
"when and to the extent he reasonably believes that such conduct
is necessary to defend ... against ... imminent use of unlawful
force."'41 Connecticut's statute, unlike most, allows a person to
use force to defend another person from "what he reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force ..
without mentioning that that force need be unlawful.14 2 But the
Appellate Court of Connecticut has ruled in an abortuary trespass
case that the defense of others justification was not available
because abortion, being legal and constitutionally protected, is
not "an injury under the law. 14 3
Some state defensive force statutes define "unlawful" con-
duct simply as conduct that is "criminal or tortious," which adds
nothing to the commonly recognized definition of the word.144
Others, such as Florida, do not define "unlawful.' 4 5 In states
where "unlawful" is not defined, it seems reasonable to consider
"unlawful" conduct or force in its common sense, as conduct or
force that "is contrary to, prohibited, or unauthorized by law."', 46
In either event, legal abortion would not be unlawful, so a
defendant likely could not raise defense of others to justify killing
an abortionist.
The Model Penal Code takes a broader view of what consti-
tutes unlawful force, defining it as:
[F]orce, including confinement, that is employed without the
consent of the person against whom it is directed and the
employment of which constitutes such offense or actionable
defense of a third person justified where self-defense would be justified. Section 3.04(1)
permits a person to use force in self-defense only in response to "unlawful" force.
139. LAFAVE & SCOTT, sutpra note 36, S 5.8, at 463 (emphasis added); see also id. S
5.8(a), at 463-64.
140. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1145 (3d ed. 1982)
(emphasis added).
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 776.012 (West 1993).
142. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53a-19(a) (West 1985).
143. State v. Clarke, 590 A.2d 468, 469-70 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
144. See, e.g., 720 ICLS S 5/7-1, 1961 comm. cmts. at 292 (West 1993); WIS. STAT.
ANN. S 939.49(3).
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 776.012 (West 1993).
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (5th ed. 1979).
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tort or would constitute an offense or tort except for a defense
(such as the absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity;
duress; youth; or diplomatic status) not amounting to a priv-
ilege to use the force.1 4 7
This definition of "unlawful force" encompasses more than
actual crimes or torts. For example, an attack by a legally insane
person, or a person incapable of forming the state of mind
necessary to commit a crime or tort, or a person covered by
diplomatic immunity would still be considered "unlawful," and
therefore justify defensive force. This reflects the policy choice
that "it cannot be regarded as a crime to safeguard an innocent
person ... against threatened death or injury that is unprivileged,
even though the source of the threat is free from fault."148
Even this expanded definition of "unlawful force" would not
help the defendant who kills an abortionist. The abortionist
(typically) is not performing an act that would be unlawful but
for a defense he has to the act. The abortionist need not claim
insanity, or lack of mens rea, or some type of immunity to avoid
legal sanction for committing abortions. Instead, he is performing
an act that, thanks to Roe, Doe, and their progeny, is not only
legal, but affirmatively protected from meaningful restriction in
most cases throughout nine months of pregnancy. Despite the
butchery that occurs inside abortuaries,'4 9 legal abortions are not
considered unlawful force in the eyes of the human law.
147. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.11(I).
148. Id. cmt. 1, at 159.
149. Two particularly gruesome abortion techniques are saline injection and dilation
and extraction (D & X). In an abortion by saline injection, the abortionist injects a
concentrated saline solution into the amniotic fluid. The high concentration of salt burns
off the baby's outer layer of skin and usually causes a painful death in about an hour.
The mother typically goes into labor the next day and delivers a dead, desiccated baby.
See FOURNIER, supra note 33, at 14. In a D & X abortion, the abortionist pulls all of the
baby's body except the head outside the womb, forces scissors into the base of the baby's
skull, and opens the scissors to enlarge the hole. Then, the abortionist inserts a catheter
into the hole to suck the baby's brains out. After that, the abortionist removes the baby.
See Shock-tactic Ads Target Late-Term Abortion Procedure, LIFE ADVOCATE, Sept. 1993, at
30, 31. Although both saline and D & X abortions are performed on unborn children older
than 16 weeks, even early abortions typically involve techniques that require cutting or
ripping the unborn child's body to pieces. See FOURNIER, supra note 33, at 13.
Sometimes babies aborted in late-term abortions survive the ordeal. For example,
Gianna Jessen, a 16-year old girl from San Clemente, California was aborted by saline
injection when her mother was 24 to 29 weeks pregnant.
[But Gianna was] delivered alive, weighing two pounds, her brain starved
for oxygen during the hours she spent gulping the saline solution. A nurse
of the abortion clinic staff rescued Gianna and kept her alive in an incubator.
She was diagnosed with cerebral palsy which has resulted in four operations.
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Note, however, that it is legal abortions that cannot be
considered unlawful force. This leaves a loophole for raising the
defense when the killing is done to prevent illegal abortions.
Despite Roe and the rest of the Supreme Court's abortion cases,
not all abortions are legal. States may prohibit abortions after
viability except where necessary to protect the mother's life or
health. 150 If a defendant can show that he reasonably believed
the abortions he sought to prevent by acting were illegal abor-
tions, the defense of others justification should be available to
him (assuming he can establish the justification's other ele-
ments).151
As a practical matter, the fact that not all abortions are
legal would not be likely to make the defense of others justifi-
cation available in many - if any - cases. Given the open-ended
definition of maternal "health" the Supreme Court adopted in
Doe v. Bolton,15 2 the universe of illegal abortions is small (even
with the restrictions now allowed by Casey). Even after her
unborn baby is viable, a woman who wants to abort that baby
need only convince a doctor (or perhaps two doctors) that her
"emotional, psychological or familial" well-being would suffer if
she could not have an abortion. While "abortion on demand" for
all nine months of pregnancy technically may not be the law in
this country, "abortion effectively on demand" probably is a fair
description of the law.
A defendant might try to argue that his killing of an abor-
tionist was justified by the general necessity, or choice of evils
defense rather than by the defense of others justification. The
She still walks with a slight limp and sometimes stumbles but otherwise she
is a bright, energetic teenager with amazing talents.
Gianna Jessen to Highlight MCFL Convention and Dinner, MAss. CITIZENS FOR LIFE NEWS,
Sept. 1994, at 16. Ana Rosa Rodrigues also was born alive, but with one arm severed,
several days after Dr. Abu Hayat botched a third-trimester abortion. Hayat is facing 20
to 60 years in prison for botching Ana's abortion; in a strange twist, it is unlikely that
Hayat would have been prosecuted had the abortion succeeded and Ana been killed (even
though the abortion was technically illegal). See Doctor is Convicted in Case of Maimed
Baby, LIFE ADVOCATE, Apr. 1993, at 24-25.
150. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. Florida, for example, has
prohibited post-viability abortions except where necessary to preserve the mother's life
or health. See Fla. Stat. Ann. S 390.001(2) (West 1993).
151. Cf. United States v. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV, slip op. at 3-4 (illegally performed
abortions would be an "evil" or "harm" for purposes of the general necessity defense,
even if that defense does not allow legal activity to qualify as an evil to be avoided);
People v. Crowley, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 151 n.3 (holding that legal abortions are not a legally
cognizable harm for purposes of the general necessity defense, but suggesting that action
to prevent illegal abortions might be justified).
152. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also Rice, supra note 9, at 21.
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common formulations of this defense do not require that the
harm to be avoided necessarily be an illegal harm.11 For example,
the Model Penal Code's lesser evils provision justifies conduct
"the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or to another" if "the harm or evil sought to be avoided
by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged."'154 The New York Penal
Law lesser evils provision justifies "conduct which would other-
wise constitute an offense" if "[sluch conduct is necessary as an
emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury
... which is of such gravity that ... the desirability and urgency
of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoid-
ing the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining
the offense in issue."155
A problem exists, however, in applying these defenses in a
defensive force situation. For example, the New York Penal Law's
general necessity defense applies only "[u]nless otherwise limited
by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use
of physical force .... "156 In other words, the specific justification
defense provision applying to the use of force - including de-
fensive force - trumps the general necessity provision. That
provision, like most defense of others provisions, limits the use
of defensive physical force to situations in which a person is
resisting unlawful force. 157
Likewise, the Model Penal Code's general necessity justifi-
cation does not apply if "the Code ... provides ... defenses
dealing with the specific situation involved ... ."15 Since the
Model Penal Code provides a specific justification defense for the
use of force to defend another person, it would seem that the
Code's general necessity defense would not be available in that
situation (which is the situation of the defendant who has killed
an abortionist to save the lives of unborn children). Again, that
provision, like most defense of others provisions, allows a person
to use force only to resist unlawful force.159
153. See United States v. Hill, No. 94-03118-RV, slip op. at 3 (noting that harm to
be avoided in general necessity defense need not result from illegal activity); see also
Senftle, supra note 136, at 527-29 (arguing that general necessity defense does not require
that the harm to be avoided be unlawful).
154. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.02(IXa).
155. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 35.05(2).
156. Id. S 35.05.
157. Id. S 35.15(1).
158. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.02(1)(b).
159. Id. S 3.05(1)(a)-(b) (justifying force to defend another only where self-defense
would be justified); S 3.04(1) (justifying self-defensive force only to resist unlawful force).
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It is arguable, at least in the case of the Model Penal Code,
that the general necessity defense would justify defensive force
to save lives even from a lawful threat. This is because the
Code's drafters made an explicit decision not to exclude homicide
from the justification's scope, stating that "[iut would be partic-
ularly unfortunate to exclude homicidal conduct from the scope
of the defense."'160 The Code's drafters and some commentators
believe the general necessity defense should be available for a
person who takes one life to spare two or more lives.' 61 This
principle, as proposed by the Code's drafters, would provide
justification for intentional killing (that is, intentional not only in
the sense that the actor's conduct will inevitably result in death
even though the actor does not desire that result, but also in
the sense that the actor's specific purpose in performing the act
is to kill) done to avoid a greater harm. 62 Thus, the Code proposes
the following example:
Suppose ... the citizens of a town receive a credible threat
... that everyone in the town will be killed unless the towns-
people themselves kill their mayor, who is hiding. If the
townspeople accede, they would have a substantial argument
against criminal liability under this section .... 163
This position has some support in case law. In United States
v. Holmes,16 4 thirty-two passengers and nine seamen, including
Holmes, boarded a lifeboat after a shipwreck. When a storm
threatened to sink the boat, Holmes and some other crew mem-
bers threw fourteen male and two female passengers overboard
160. Id. S 3.02, cmt. 3, at 14-15. Cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. S 939.47 (West Supp. 1993)
(necessity only reduces first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional
homicide); also cf Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 563.026 (Vernon 1979) (general necessity defense does
not apply to murder).
161. See MODEL PENAL CODE 5 3.02, cmt. 3, at 14-16; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note
36, S 5.4, at 442-443.
162. As we will discuss in part II, we do not agree that it is morally justified to kill
another human being intentionally, even to achieve a good end, except in cases of a just
war, a justified rebellion, or capital punishment. Nor do we believe the law should
explicitly sanction such intentional killing (although we do recognize the law is perhaps
limited in its ability to discern an actor's intent and may therefore at times tolerate
killing in limited circumstances that may have been intentional). We are merely suggesting
a possible legal argument an abortionist's killer might make in his defense.
163. MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.02, cmt. 3, n.15. See also LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note
37, S 5.4, at 442 ("[Wlhen A in an emergency intentionally kills B to save C and D, he
may be eligible for the defense of necessity" because "it is better that two lives be saved
and one lost than that two lives be lost and one saved").
164. 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15383).
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to lighten the load so that the boat would not go under.165 Holmes
and the lifeboat's other remaining passengers survived; but after
he reached port, Holmes was tried for manslaughter. 16 The trial
court instructed the jury that seamen have a special duty to
their passengers, and in times of emergency must sacrifice their
own lives to save the passengers. Therefore, the seamen not
necessary to manage the boat "have no right, for their safety, to
sacrifice the passengers."' 167 The court also told the jury that in
the case of equally situated people, killing some could be justified
if the victims were selected by lots.'6 The jury convicted Holmes,
and the court upheld the conviction. 69
Underlying the court's instructions in Holmes is the assump-
tion that necessity can justify the intentional killing of innocent
people. The court's statement that excess seamen have no right
to sacrifice passengers implies that seamen who are needed to
manage the boat may sacrifice passengers if necessary. And the
court's suggestion that victims be chosen by lot assumes that it
is proper to sacrifice innocent victims in the first place. 170
Another case lending some support to the view that neces-
sity can justify intentionally killing an innocent human being is
the English case of Rex v. Bourne.171 In Bourne, a doctor was on
trial for having performed an abortion on a young girl who had
been raped. The abortion statute under which the doctor was
prosecuted forbade "unlawful" abortions, but did not mention any
exception for abortions performed to save the woman's life or
165. Id. at 361.
166. Id. at 362-63. LaFave and Scott note that the proper charge should have been
murder, since the killings were intentional, but that the grand jury "apparently refused
to indict for more than manslaughter." LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 37, S 5.4, at 445
n.31.
167. 26 F. Cas. at 367 (emphasis added).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 368-69.
170. A later English lifeboat case rejected the Holmes approach. In Regina v. Dudley
& Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), three sailors and a cabin boy were adrift in a lifeboat
more than 1,000 miles from land. On the twentieth day, after going nine days without
food and seven days without water, two of the sailors, Dudley and Stevens, killed the
cabin boy, fed on his flesh, and drank his blood. Four days later, a passing ship picked
up the three survivors. Id. at 273-75. Dudley and Stevens were tried and convicted for
murder, and on appeal the court held that killing the innocent cabin boy was not justified
by necessity. The English court expressly rejected Holmes' suggestion "that the proper
mode of determining who was to be sacrificed was to vote upon the subject" as "hardly...
an authority satisfactory to a court in [England]" Id. at 285. We discuss Dudley & Stevens
further in part II.
171. 3 All E.R. 615 (1938).
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health. 172 However, the judge applied the necessity defense and
instructed the jury not to convict unless it found that the Crown
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the doctor had not
performed the abortion in good faith to preserve the girl's life.
73
This was so even though "[tjhe law of this land has always held
human life to be sacred, and the protection that the law gives
to human life it extends also to the unborn child....",4 But,
continued, the court, "[tihe unborn child in the womb must not
be destroyed unless the destruction of that child is for the
purpose of preserving the yet more precious life of the mother."'
175
One could argue from the Model Penal Code's approach to
necessity, supported to some extent by Holmes and Bourne, that
some necessity defense (whether called a general lesser evils
defense or defense of others) should be available to a defendant
who kills an abortionist to save the unborn children the abor-
tionist was about to kill. It makes no sense to allow necessity to
justify killing an innocent person to save human lives but to deny
the same defense to a person who kills an aggressor to save
human lives. It should not matter that the law does not prohibit
the aggressor's conduct. Certainly, neither the mayor in the
Model Penal Code example, the hapless sailor in a lifeboat who
drew the wrong lot, nor the unborn child in Bourne were engaging
in any unlawful conduct at the times their lives were taken.
It is doubtful, however, that any court would accept this
argument. While there are a few unreported exceptions,'176 re-
ported cases uniformly have rejected the idea that necessity can
justify any illegal action taken to prevent abortions. 77 One of the
principal reasons given for this rejection has been that abortion
is legal, constitutionally protected conduct and therefore does not
constitute a legally cognizable harm.17 Thus, the law comes full
circle; first, it has stripped the unborn child of any meaningful
protection by the public authorities whose job it is to protect
172. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.4, at 443 n.12.
173. 3 All E.R. 616, 617. The court did not instruct the jury in so many words to
acquit if the doctor performed the abortion to preserve the mother's life or health. But
the judge did tell the jury to acquit if it thought there was no clear distinction between
health and life even though the girl was not facing imminent death. See id. at 617-18.
Commentators thus have read Bourne as standing for the principle that necessity justifies
abortion to preserve the mother's life or health. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S
5.4, at 443 n.12; see also Byrn, supra note 94, at 854 n.280.
174. 3 All E.R. at 620.
175. Id.
176. See cases cited supra at note 69.
177. See cases cited supra at note 68.
178. See, e.g., Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d at 929; Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. Mc-
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innocent human life; then, by bootstrapping on the holding that
the unborn may not receive protection from public authorities,
the courts hold that unborn children also may not receive pro-
tection from private citizens because abortion is "lawful."
d. Is abortion really lawful?
In determining that abortion is a "right" and therefore must
be allowed by law, the Supreme Court purported to be inter-
preting the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. But a
fair reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, in light of the his-
torical context of its enactment, supports the conclusion that the
amendment was meant to protect all human life, including unborn
children. The evil of slavery was precisely that the law arbitrarily
had stripped a segment of living human beings of legal protection.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott that freed slaves
could not be citizens was based on the idea that slaves were
merely property. 179 In Bailey v. Poindexter's Executor,180 counsel
seeking to strike down a provision in a will allowing the testator's
slaves to choose between emancipation and sale argued that "in
the eye of the law, so far certainly as civil rights and relations
are concerned, the slave is not a person, but a thing .... The
attribution of legal personality to a chattel slave, - legal con-
science, legal intellect, legal freedom, or liberty and power of
free choice and action ... implies a palpable contradiction in
terms."'" The court agreed that the slave "has no civil rights or
privileges" and struck down the will provision allowing the slaves
to choose freedom or sale because slaves had no legal capacity
to choose.182 The court also suggested in dictum that only free
persons enjoyed the right to "protection from injury."183
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted
to reverse decisions such as Dred Scott and Bailey and thus
prevent the state from degrading "human beings.. .to the status
of property, without civil rights - without even the right to the
Monagle, 868 F.2d at 1352; People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211, 213 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); State
v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d at 190-92; Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d at 1078-
79; City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d at 176-77; Comnwnwealth v. Wall, 539 A.2d at
1328; People v. Crowley, 538 N.Y.S.2d 146, 149-50 (1989).
179. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-406 (1856).
180. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858).
181. Id. at 142-43.
182. Id. at 191-93.
183. Id. at 191.
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law's protection of their lives.... "184 In other words, those amend-
ments were meant to prevent the type of legal reasoning em-
ployed in Roe. Thus:
The precise purpose of Congress in submitting the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments was to establish that the con-
cept of "human being" and "person" were one and the same
concept rather than different concepts, as they had in practice
been treated by many states, the federal courts, and even at
times by the federal legislature and executive, as well as to
insure constitutional protection for all human beings, of what-
ever age and of whatever condition, from the time of their
creation and endowment with human nature at conception by
God, with respect to their right to life and all other funda-
mental human rights. It was the view of their framers that
the concept of "person" had been misconstrued and misapplied
between the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
their submission of these amendments for adoption. It was
their purpose to establish a new definition of person consonant
with biological reality and common sense so as to comprehend
all human beings. 185
With regard specifically to abortion, at the time the Four-
teenth Amendment was proposed and ratified, the prevalent
mood in this country was against abortion, at any stage of the
unborn's development. "Almost all the then existing states en-
acted abortion statutes during the nineteenth century."'186 By
1868, twenty-eight of the thirty-seven states had made abortion
before quickening a crime. By 1883, thirty-five of thirty-eight
states had done so.'8
As the Supreme Court itself noted in Roe, "[tlhe anti-abortion
mood prevalent in this country in the late nineteenth century
was shared by the medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the
profession may have played a significant role in the enactment
of stringent criminal abortion legislation during that period."'
The nineteenth century medical profession's attitude toward abor-
184. Byrn, supra note 94, at 837; see also Rice, supra note 9, at 30 n.81 ("Before the
Civil War, the law considered slaves as chattels. 'The slave, therefore, had no political
or civil rights .... If he was killed by a white, the white would probably not be tried
for murder."') (quoting M. MEILZER, SLAVERY II: FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO TODAY 202)
(1972).
185. Joseph P. Witherspoon, Impact of the Abortion Decisions Upon the Father's Role,
35 THE JURIST 32, 42 (1975); see generally Byrn, supra note 94, at 837-39.
186. Byrn, supra note 94, at 827 & n.132.
187. Id. at 836 & nn.186 & 187.
188. 410 U.S. 113, 141 (1973).
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tion was based primarily on the belief that the unborn child was
a human being from the moment of conception. In 1867, the
Medical Society of New York "condemned abortion at every stage
of gestation as murder."119 The American Medical Association
had expressed a similar view almost a decade earlier. In 1859,
the AMA adopted a report that called on state legislatures to
pass laws restricting abortion, which the report called "the un-
warranted destruction of human life." 190 In support of this call,
the AMA cited the "grave defects of our laws ... as regards the
independent and actual existence of the child before birth as a
living being ... with strange inconsistency, the law fully acknowl-
edges the fetus in utero and its inherent rights for civil purposes;
while personally and as criminally affected it fails to recognize
it and to its life as yet denies all protection."'191 In 1871, the AMA
Committee on Criminal Abortion amplified these conclusions,
reporting, "We had to deal with human life. In a matter of less
importance we could entertain no compromise. An honest judge
on the bench would call things by their proper names. We could
do no less.' 1 92
It is unlikely that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers
"acted in defiance of both the 1859 AMA statement and state
legislation, and deliberately created an unarticulated right of
privacy which included the right to kill unborn children whom
the framers intended to exclude from Fourteenth Amendment
protection.' ' 93 In fact, it is likely that "the framers of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments ... knew well that the
existence of the unborn child was a biological reality."'9 4 For the
medical profession was not alone in calling for stricter abortion
laws based on the unborn child's humanity. In 1868, Francis
Wharton (not for the first time) urged that the quickening dis-
tinction in abortion statutes was unjust and "argued that unborn
children should be protected regardless of gestational age."' 95
In any event, it should not matter for the unborn child's
constitutional protection whether the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
189. Byrn, supra note 94, at 836.
190. See id. at 835; see also NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 164.
191. NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 164 (quoting AMA report); see also Byrn, supra
note 94, at 835.
192. Byrn, supra note 94, at 836; see also NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 164.
193. Byrn, supra note 94, at 838.
194. Rice, supra note 9, at 30 (citing Witherspoon, supra note 185, at 42).
195. Byrn, supra note 94, at 836 (citing 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 210-12 (6th ed. 1868)).
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Amendment's framers had the unborn child specifically in mind
when they drafted those amendments. Medical developments
since the mid- and late-1800s, particularly the development of the
medical discipline of fetology, have fully confirmed that distinctly
human life begins at conception. 19 A court must often apply a
constitutional provision to a situation the provision's drafters
might. not have envisioned, as for example, in Katz v. United
States,'9 in which the Court held that electronic eavesdropping
(a practice unknown in the 1790s) is a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 98 If the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments were meant to equate humanity with personhood
to ensure that government could never again proclaim any class
of human beings as unworthy of legal protection, and if devel-
opments since the amendments were passed have confirmed that
the unborn child is indeed a human being, the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments should protect the class of unborn chil-
dren as they protect any other class of human beings. 199
Notwithstanding constitutional provisions, abortion is not
lawful according to the only law that ultimately matters - God's
law. The Supreme Court's fiat that abortion is a constitutionally
protected "right" cannot make abortion lawful by this standard.
Unborn children are innocent human beings - indeed, as innocent
as any human beings can be. Value judgments about when human
196. See generally NATHANSON, supra note 12, at 111-175. "Fetology is the study and
science of the human unborn .... [Fletology has become such a comprehensive and well
established medical specialty that it has even sprouted sub-specialties." Id. at 3-4. Ironi-
cally, fetology became recognized as a medical specialty in 1973, the year thq Supreme
Court decided Roe. See id. at 4.
197. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
198. See id. at 351-53.
199. One might argue that this approach allows a judge to ignore the limits the
amendment's drafters have placed on the rule of law created by the amendment. It goes
without saying that in interpreting a legal text, a judge is bound by the limits on that
text imposed by the text's drafters; otherwise, judges usurp decision making power not
granted to them. See American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 138-39
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). We share this concern, but this concern does
not in turn justify a narrow-minded literalism under which only evils identified at the
time of the amendment's drafting are forbidden. Id. at 138 (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
To interpret the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses to exclude unborn children simply because the amendment's drafters
were not aware of the breakthroughs in fetology that confirm the unborn's membership
in the human race would be to adopt the "narrow minded literalism" Judges Bork and
Easterbrook have warned against. To interpret "person" to include unborn children is
faithful to the rule established by the Fourteenth Amendment - that no group of human
beings may arbitrarily be denied legal protection, as the slaves were.
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life should be protected, masquerading as "objective" theories
about when human life begins, cannot obscure this fact. 200 Killing
innocent human beings is wrong; "Thou shalt not kill" is still
(and always has been) a commandment, not a suggestion.
This involves the issue of whether there is a higher law
than man's law, and whether that higher law has any proper role
in shaping and limiting human law. The natural law tradition, as
exemplified most clearly in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,
holds that human law is subject to a higher standard, God's law,
which includes the natural law. According to this tradition, a
human law that "deflects from the law of nature" is no longer a
law but a perversion of law, and an unjust law is "no law at
all." 2 1 A law can be unjust in two ways:
[F]irst, by being contrary to human good ... either in
respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his
subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common
good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory-or in
respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that goes
beyond the power committed to him-or in respect of the
form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the commu-
nity, although with a view to the common good. The like are
acts of violence rather than laws; because as Augustine says
(De Lib Arb. i.5), a law that is not just, seems to be no law
at all. Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except
perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which
cause man should even yield his right ....
Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to
the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to
idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and
laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated
in Acts v. 29, we ought to obey God rather than men.202
Any law allowing abortion, including the Supreme Court's
holding that women have a "right" to abortion, is unjust, and
therefore "no law at all." By singling out a class of human beings
as unworthy of legal protection, who therefore can be legally
killed at another person's discretion, a law allowing abortion
imposes burdens unequally on the community. Moreover, al-
200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
201. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I - II, Q. 95, art. 2 & Q. 96,
art. 4 (English Dominican trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911) (hereinafter cited as
"S.T.").
202. Id. Q. 96, art. 4 (emphasis added). An example of a law contrary to Divine good
would be a law compelling doctors to commit abortions. Doctors would be morally required
to disobey such a law, even on pain of death. See Charles E. Rice, Natural Law, the
Constitution, and the Family, 1 LIBERTY, LIFE AND FAMILY 77, 89 (1994).
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though the government need not (and probably should not) pro-
hibit every vice, 03 human law must prohibit vices "without the
prohibition of which human society could not be maintained. 20 4
Aquinas mentions only two such vices: murder and theft. It is
almost self-evident that no society could function if the law
allowed people to kill each other at will. Abortion, as the inten-
tional killing of an innocent human being, is murder. Thus, the
state may never validly tolerate abortion.2 0 5 By requiring states
to make abortion legal, Roe violates the Divine good; it forces
states, and state officials, to abandon their duty to protect in-
nocent human life.
The application of higher law principles is not foreign to the
law. The most striking example of this application came in Nazi
war crimes trials after World War II. For example, in one case,
physicians who had participated in "experimental killings" de-
fended themselves by asserting that their participation was legal
under the laws of the Third Reich. An appellate court at Frank-
furt rejected this argument, declaring:
Law must be defined as an ordinance or precept devised in
the service of justice. Whenever the conflict between an enacted
law and true justice reaches unendurable proportions, the
enacted law must yield to justice, and be considered a "lawless
law [unrichtiges Recht]." An accused may not justify his con-
duct by appealing to an existing law if this law offended
against certain self-evident precepts of the natural law.206
In another case, a German officer who summarily shot a
soldier who was absent without leave defended himself by as-
serting that his action was legal under Hitler's so-called Katas-
203. See id. Q. 96, art 2. Because most people are not capable of becoming perfectly
virtuous, any attempt to forbid every vice would likely be impossible to enforce. This in
turn could cause people to "despise the law" and thus result in "greater evils." Id. In
most cases, then, deciding what vices to prohibit, and to what degree to prohibit those
vices, is a matter for the lawmaker's prudential judgement. See infra notes 267-72 for a
further discussion of this point.
204. Id. Q. 96, art. 2; see Rice, supra note 202, at 89, 90.
205. See LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH nos. 2270,
2273 (U.S. Catholic Conference trans., 1994). Although the law can never validly tolerate
murder of an innocent, the analysis becomes a bit more complex when a person kills in
a situation in which he would be morally justified in using force to defend himself or
another except for the fact that his real purpose for killing is to harm the aggressor
rather than to defend the victim (which in moral terms is murder). See infra text
accompanying notes 267-72.
206. Ernst Von Hippel, Note, The Role of Natural Law in the Legal Decisions of the
German Federal Republic, 4 NAT. L.F. 106, 111 (1959) (emphasis added) (quoting 2
SUDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN ZEITSCHRIF 521 (1947)).
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trophen-order which allowed any member of the armed forces to
kill instantly any deserter. Again, the German courts rejected
the defense:
Even if the Katastrophen-order had been promulgated in due
form it could not have become law [Recht]. For the positive
legislative act is intrinsically limited. It loses all obligatory
power if it violates the generally recognized principles of
international law or the natural law [Naturrecht], or if the
contradiction between positive law and justice reaches such an
intolerable degree that the law, as unrichtiges Recht, must give
way to justice.207
Post-war German courts also appealed to higher law to
uphold the claims of Jewish citizens seeking to recover property
that had been confiscated after they had fled Germany. The
confiscation was legally authorized by the 1935 Nuernberg anti-
Semitic legislation which had declared that German Jews living
outside the country or who subsequently fled or emigrated would
lose their German citizenship and forfeit their property to the
state. In recognizing the Jewish citizens' claims, the court held
that the Nuernberg law, "though clothed in the formal rules of
the legality of a law, cannot be considered as a genuine Rechts-
norm as to content .... [The law is] an extremely grave violation
of the suprapositive principle of equality before the law as well
as of the suprapositve guarantee of property .... 208
Abortion was not unknown to the Nazis; indeed, it was a
major component of the Nazis' "systematic program of genocide,
aimed at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic
groups ... ."20 One of the indictments in the war crimes trials
accused defendants of forcing Polish and other Eastern European
women to undergo abortions. 210 But at trial, the prosecution made
clear that crimes against the women themselves were not the
only reason for indicting the defendants:
Abortions were prohibited in Germany .... Abortions were
also prohibited under the Polish Penal Code ... and under
207. Heinrich Rommen, Natural Law in Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and
of the Constitutional Courts in Germany, 4 NAT. L.F. 1, 11 (1959) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
208. Id. at 14 (quoting 15 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDRSGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN
76 (1951)).
209. 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 609-13 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office 1949). See generally
WILLIAM BRENNAN, THE ABORTION HOLOCAUST 33-37 (1983).
210. TRIALS, supra note 209, at 613.
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the Soviet Penal Code.... But protection of the law was denied
to unborn children of the Russian and Polish women in Nazi
Germany. Abortions were encouraged and even forced on
these women.2 1'
As one commentator has noted:
The right of the unborn child to the law's protection was a
litigated issue .... Neither prosecution nor defense could
ignore the aborted children who stood as mute and invisible
accusers at the trial. On behalf of the United States, an
American prosecutor condemned the defendants before a court
composed of American judges because 'protection of the law
was denied to the unborn children. 212
Despite Roe, abortion is not lawful under a proper interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the higher law of
God. But arguments based on a. reconsideration of the Court's
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment or on higher law
principles are likely to fall on deaf ears. With regard to the
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Stevens correctly has noted that
"[n]o member of [the Supreme] Court has ever suggested that a
fetus is a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. '213 Even Justice Scalia, who among the Justices has au-
thored some of the more articulate and pointed critiques of the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, believes that the ques-
tion of when human life begins is a "nonjusticiable question" that
must be left to the "political process.1214 In Scalia's view, "The
states may, if they wish, permit abortion-on-demand, but the
Constitution does not require them to do so.''215
Higher law arguments are likely to fail as well, because Roe
itself is "probably the clearest example of triumphant positivism
211. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
212. Byrn, supra note 94, at 834 (citation omitted).
213. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 779 n.8 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2839 (Stevens,
J., concurring and dissenting) ("no member of the Court has ever questioned [the]
fundamental proposition" that "an abortion is not 'the termination of life entitled to
Fourteenth Amendment protection"') (citation omitted).
214. Ohio v. Akron Reproductive Health Ctr., 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is of course
no way to determine [whether the unborn child is a human life] as a legal matter; it is
a value judgment. Some societies have considered newborn children not yet human, or
the incompetent elderly no longer so.").
215. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2873.
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in American law ... ,"216 This type of positivism is the legal
philosophy that holds that the higher law - in other words,
objective morality - is irrelevant in formulating and applying
civil law because it is impossible for man to know objective
morality. To the positivist, therefore, law is essentially the as-
sertion of the lawmaker's will. A law is valid so long as the
lawmaker validly enacts it, and a law's content has nothing to
do with its validity. In the words of Hans Kelsen, this century's
leading positivist jurist:
[L]egal norms ... are not valid by virtue of their content.
Any content whatsoever can be legal; there is no human
behavior which could not function as the content of a legal
norm. A norm becomes a legal norm only because it has been
constituted in a particular fashion, born of a definite proce-
dure and definite rule .... The individual norms of the legal
system ... must be constituted by an act of will, not deduced
by an act of thought.217
When Kelsen wrote that "[alny content whatsoever can be
legal," he meant it. Witness Kelsen's response to Nazi law that
authorized concentration camps, forced labor, and murder: "Such
measures may morally be violently condemned; but they cannot
be considered as taking place outside the legal order .... 218
Thus, to the positivist, "the law ... under the Nazi-government
was law. .... "219
It follows that in positivist jurisprudence, the human being
has no intrinsic value. To quote Oliver Wendell Holmes, for such
a positivist there is no final reason for attributing to man a
"significance different in kind from that which belongs to a
baboon or a grain of sand.' 0 Thus, for the positivist, a legal
"person" is whatever the court says is a legal person. 221 This
philosophy undergirds the cases upholding the "right" to abortion.
For instance, after finding that the unborn child is "human ...
216. CHARLES E. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE SECULAR
STATE 49 (1979).
217. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 51 L.Q. REV. 517, 517-18 (C.H. Wilson
trans., 1935); see also HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 198 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
218. KELSEN, supra note 217, at 40.
219. HANS KELSEN, DAS NATURRECHT IN DER POLITISCHEN THEORIE 148 (F.M. Schmoetz
ed., 1963) (quoted in translation in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
(THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE) 56 (1976)).
220. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 252 (Mark DeWolfe, ed., 1946); See generally Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 252 (1918).
221. See Senftle, supra note 136, at 544 (citing HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND STATE 93 (1945)).
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and it is unquestionably alive," the New York Court of Appeals
in Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp.222 went on
to hold that the legislature could define that living human as a
nonperson, and also allow it to be aborted.223 In classic positivist
reasoning, the court, citing Hans Kelsen among others, stated
that:
What is ... a legal person is for the law, including of course
the Constitution, to say, which simply means that upon ac-
cording legal personality to a thing the law affords it the
rights and privileges of a legal person (e.g., Kelsen, General
Theory of Law and State, pp. 93 - 109) .... The point is that
it is a policy determination whether legal personality should
attach and not a question of biological or "natural" corre-
spondence.2 4
Although Roe dodged the question of whether the unborn
child is a human being, its holding that he is not a person
regardless of his humanity involves the same positivist reasoning
that the Byrn court made explicit.2 25 At least with respect to the
unborn, this view is not confined to the Justices who would
uphold Roe, as evidenced by Justice Scalia's belief that whether
or not the unborn is human is a "value judgment" that must be
left to the "political process."' 26 Thus, because Roe and the Court's
other abortion cases are themselves statements of the reigning
positivist jurisprudence, a defendant seeking to justify illegal
action taken to defend unborn children will be unlikely, to say
the least, to succeed by arguing that abortion contravenes a
higher law.
222. 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972); see supra note 16.
223. See id. at 889-90.
224. Id. at 889.
225. In Byrn, the trial court had found that "as a medical fact, the fetus is a live
human being." Both the appellate division and the court of appeals accepted this finding.
The plaintiff in Byrn (who had challenged New York's permissive abortion law on behalf
of a class of unborn children whom he represented as guardian ad litem) appealed to the
Supreme Court. One of the questions on appeal was "[wihether the (unborn children],
each of whom is a live 'human being,' a 'child [with] a separate life,' a 'human' who is
'alive' and 'has an autonomy of development and character," are human persons entitled
to the protections afforded such persons by the Constitution of the United States." Rather
than face that question (and have to state explicitly that the unborn child is not a human
being or that a living human being is not a person for constitutional purposes), the
Supreme Court dismissed the Byrn appeal for want of a substantial federal question in
the wake of Roe. See Byrn, supra note 94, at 841-42.
226. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ohio v. Akron Reproductive
Health Ctr., 497 U.S. at 520; see also notes 214 and 215 and accompanying text.
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The authors of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey began their opinion with the observation that "[1liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."m Whatever this
"august and sonorous"' observation means, it would have been
more accurate to say that "liberty - or any other right - finds
no refuge in a positivist jurisprudence." For as slavery and the
Nazi horrors graphically remind us, a legal system that does not
acknowledge a fixed moral order to guide and limit human law
cannot ultimately protect human rights. If law is simply the
lawmaker's exercise of will, and law's content does not actually
matter, what is to prevent the lawmaker from, for instance,
requiring a woman to have an abortion? One may say the Con-
stitution prevents this. But the Constitution itself is law and can
be amended. In a purely positivist legal system, there is nothing
to prevent amending the Constitution to allow forced abortions,
or involuntary euthanasia, or property confiscation, or any other
encroachment on human rights, so long as those with the legal
authority to amend the Constitution can be persuaded to adopt
that encroachment.
For all practical purposes, the only reason it is even neces-
sary to discuss whether killing an abortionist could be legally
justified is because of the corrupting influence Roe and the
positivist jurisprudence it reflects have had on the law and on
our society. In any civilized society, all human beings have a
natural right to be treated as persons entitled to the right to
live. The brutality of American slavery and Nazi Germany's
atrocities bear poignant reference to the danger of severing the
natural bond between humanity and personhood.
Americans need to answer some hard questions. Would we
think that a person who used necessary force to defend a slave
was legally justified to use that force? Would we think that a
person who physically defended a Jew from Nazi efforts to herd
him to a death camp was legally justified? If we answer those
questions, "yes," we have to ask why is it that American law
does not legally justify necessary efforts to protect the unborn
from death. The apparent reason is that American law has
deemed the unborn child unworthy of legal protection - just as
earlier American courts deemed slaves and Nazi law deemed
Jews unworthy of legal protection.
227. 112 S. Ct. at 2803 (joint opinion).
228. 112 S. Ct. at 2876 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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If American law regarded the unborn child as a person, as
it should, that law, pursuant to the privilege to defend others
and the general necessity defense, would allow others to defend
that child against the abortionist and, possibly, even to kill the
abortionist to defend that child. More basically, however, if Amer-
ican law regarded the unborn child as a person, there would be
no legalized abortuaries, and legal authority, rather than private
individuals acting on their own initiative, would defend the child.
The question of whether killing abortionists can be legally and
morally justified, would become again what it ought to be - an
interesting but abstract academic question.
II. Is KILLING THE ABORTIONIST MORALLY JUSTIFIED?
Suppose a court does allow a defendant to argue that killing
an abortionist was a legally justifiable use of force in defense of
another. Suppose further the defendant convinces the jury to
acquit him. This would provide legal vindication for the defen-
dant. Legal vindication is nice (particularly when a defendant is
facing the death penalty), but man's ultimate goal is eternal
salvation.229 When the rich man asked Jesus what he had to do
to have eternal life, the first thing Christ told him was to "keep
the commandments," including the commandment, "You shall not
kill." 230 Likewise, the First Letter of John tells us that "the way
we may be sure that we know [Christ] is to keep his command-
ments."23
1
Thus, in the Christian scheme of things, a more important
question than "Does civil law justify killing an abortionist?" is,
"Does God's law justify killing the abortionist?" We turn now to
how Roman Catholic moral teaching would answer that question.
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the natural law is a rule
of reason that God has promulgated in man's nature so that man
can discern how to act to achieve the purpose God created him
for - eternal salvation.232 Unlike the relativists, St. Thomas
229. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, nos. 1, 1700-01.
230. See Matthew 19:16-18; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR [THE
SPLENDOR OF TRUTH] no. 6. (Vatican trans., 1993).
231. 1 John 2:3; see also 1 John 2:4 ("Whoever says, I know him,' but does not keep
his commandments is a liar ..
232. See 2 S.T., Part I-II, Q. 91, art 2; cf. Romans 2:15 ("the demands of the law are
written in their hearts"). The natural law, though closely associated with St. Thomas, is
neither a Catholic doctrine nor even a Christian invention. Among others, pre-Christians
Aristotle and Cicero, and non-Catholic Christians such as Luther, Calvin, Coke, and
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taught that we can know the commands of the natural law by
the use of reason.m However, St. Thomas also recognized that
because of the weakness and concupiscence that flow from orig-
inal sin, our reason is flawed. Therefore, God also has given us
His divine revelation, which St. Thomas also referred to as divine
law, to ensure that despite our flawed reason we know what is
necessary to achieve our destiny of eternal salvation 2 In the
Catholic tradition, revelation is found in both Sacred Scripture
and Sacred Tradition, which "comes from the apostles and hands
on what they received from Jesus' teaching and example and
what they learned from the Holy Spirit."235 Catholics affirm that
Christ has entrusted this "deposit of faith" to a teaching Church
that has authority to interpret that revelation and to teach
authoritatively on faith and morals, including the natural law.M
As already noted, the human law cannot validly permit the
murder of innocent human beings.- Despite the Supreme Court's
decree, abortuaries, which are murder factories, have no moral
right to exist. Roe v. Wade, which defined the unborn child as a
nonperson subject to execution at the discretion of others, is an
unjust law and therefore void."S So, too, otherwise neutral and
just trespass laws can be unjust when they are applied to prevent
nonviolent "rescues" at abortuaries. Whether such a nonviolent
Blackstone have acknowledged the existence of a natural moral law. Because natural law
is a rule of reason implanted in man by God, and reason is not the exclusive domain of
Catholics, it is natural that others than Catholics have recognized the natural law's
existence. See generally sources cited in CHARLES E. RICE, 50 Questions on the Natural
Law: What It Is and Why We Need It 30-36 (1993). Catholics, however, recognize the
Catholic Church's claim to authoritatively interpret the natural law, and its application.
233. See 2 S.T. Part I-II, Q. 91, art. 2.
234. See id. Part I, Q. I, art. I; see also id., Part I-II, Q. 94, art. 6 ("[in] secondary
precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil
persuasions ... or by vicious customs and corrupt habits...").
235. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 83; cf. John 21:24-25
("There are also many other things that Jesus did, but if these were to be described
individually, I do not think the whole world would contain the books that would be
written"); 2 Thes. 2:15 ("hold fast to the traditions that you were taught, either by an
oral statement or by a letter of ours"); 1 Tim. 3:15 ("the church of the living God [is] the
pillar and foundation of truth"); see generally ALAN SCHRECK, CATHOLIC AND CHRISTIAN
41-53 (1984) for a good discussion of the relationship between apostolic tradition and the
Bible.
236. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 84. See generally
SCHRECK, supra note 235, at 41-98 for an overview of the Biblical and historical basis for
Catholic belief about the Church, the Papacy, and the Church's authority to interpret
and teach God's revelation.
237. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
238. See id.
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rescue will be morally justified depends upon prudential judg-
ments.5 9 But more to the immediate point, it does not follow
from the injustice of Roe v. Wade that laws forbidding the killing
of the abortionist are unjust. The Catechism of the Catholic Church
states two general criteria that govern this matter: First,
Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves
the creative action of God and it remains forever in a special
relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone
is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one
can under any circumstance claim himself the right directly
to destroy an innocent human being.24°
Second,
In the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord recalls the command-
ment, "You shall not kill," and adds to it the proscription of
anger, hatred and vengeance. Going further, Christ asks his
disciples to turn the other cheek, to love their enemies. He
did not defend himself and told Peter to leave his sword in
its sheath.241
Despite the evil of what abortionists do, their lives are still
sacred, and the command "You shall not kill" still applies gen-
erally to abortionists. The Church, however, affirms that people
have a right to defend themselves and others:
The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an
exception to the prohibition against the murder of the inno-
cent that constitutes intentional killing. "The act of self-
defense can have a double effect: the preservation of one's
own life; and the killing of the aggressor .... The one is
intended, the other is not."242 Love toward oneself remains a
fundamental principle of morality. Therefore it is legitimate
to insist on respect for one's own right to life. Someone who
defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced
to deal his aggressor a lethal blow: "If a man in self-defense
uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful, whereas
if he repels force with moderation, his defense will be lawful
.... Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act
239. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Rice, supra note 9; see also
infra text accompanying notes 281-82.
240. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 2258.
241. Id. no. 2262.
242. Id, no. 2263 (emphasis added) (quoting 3 S.T., Part II-1I, Q. 64, art. 7).
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of moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man, since
one is bound to take more care of one's own life, than of
another's."243 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but
a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the
common good of family or of the state.2 44 The prohibition of
murder does not abrogate the right to render an unjust
aggressor unable to inflict harm. Legitimate defense is a
grave duty for whoever is responsible for the lives of others
or the common good.245
The issue is whether intentionally killing an abortionist is a
legitimate exercise of the right to defend others, and therefore
not murder. In answering this question, it is essential to note
that the right to defend oneself or another does not authorize
the intentional killing of the aggressor. As we have indicated
above, the principle of the double effect governs this situation. 2
46
Catholic theologian John Hardon, S.J., explained this principle
clearly with respect to operations to remove the cancerous womb
of a pregnant woman. Such operations can be justified by the
principle of the double effect because the death of the child is
an unintended effect of an operation independently justified by
the necessity of saving the mother's life. They do not involve
the intentional killing of the child for the purpose of achieving
another good - for example, the preservation of the mother's
life.
As Father Hardon notes:
To be licitly applied the principle must observe four limiting
norms:
1. The action (removal of the diseased womb) is good;
it consists in excising an infected part of the human body.
2. The good effect (saving the mother's life) is not
obtained by means of the evil effect (death of the fetus). It
would be just the opposite, e.g., if the fetus were killed in
order to save the reputation of an unwed mother.
3. There is sufficient reason for permitting the un-
sought evil effect that unavoidably follows. Here the Church's
guidance is essential in judging that there is sufficient reason.
4. The evil effect is not intended in itself, but is merely
allowed as a necessary consequence of the good effect.
243. Id. no. 2264 (quoting 3 S.T., Part II-II. Q. 64, art. 7).
244. Id. no. 2265.
245. Id. no. 2321.
246. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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Summarily, then, the womb belongs to the mother just as
completely after a pregnancy as before. If she were not
pregnant, she would clearly be justified to save her life by
removing a diseased organ that was threatening her life. The
presence of the fetus does not deprive her of this fundamental
right. 47
The principle of the double effect could apply to the defense
of the unborn in some cases. If a person were in the room with
an abortionist as he was about to perform an abortion, he would
have the moral right, and perhaps the duty, to use reasonable
force to prevent that imminently threatened killing of the unborn
child.248 The defender's action would be moral if he used only the
force necessary to stop the killing and if his intent was to stop
the killing rather than harm the abortionist. It is most unlikely,
however, that deadly force would be necessary or justified even
in that situation. And the defender surely would have no right
to kill the abortionist intentionally.
In Catholic moral teaching, it is never acceptable for a person
to do an intrinsically evil act even if his motive is to bring about
some good result.2 49 "One may not do evil so that good may result
from it."2s° Catholic teaching is clear that intentional killing is
wrong:
The fifth commandment forbids direct and intentional killing
as gravely sinful. The murderer and those who cooperate
voluntarily in murder commit a sin that cries out to heaven
for vengeance.2 51 The fifth commandment forbids doing any-
thing with the intention of indirectly bringing about a person's
death. The moral law prohibits exposing someone to mortal
danger without grave reason, as well as refusing assistance
to a person in danger .... Unintentional killing is not morally
imputable. But one is not exonerated from grave offense if,
without proportionate reasons, he has acted in a way that
brings about someone's death, even without the intention to
do so.252
The only situations in which anyone ever has the right to
intentionally kill anyone are during a just war or a justified
247. JOHN A. HARDON, S.J., THE CATHOLIC CATECHISM 337 (1975).
248. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 2265; see also id.
no. 2269.
249. See id. nos. 1749-61; see generally VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 230, nos. 95-
97.
250. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 1756.
251. Id. at no. 2268.
252. Id. at no. 2269.
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rebellion (or what the Catechism of the Catholic Church calls
"armed resistance to oppression by political authority")251 or in
carrying out a lawful sentence of capital punishment. 2-4 The
common thread running through all these exceptions is that they
involve the use of force by the state or, in the case of justified
rebellion, by persons who justifiably have assumed the state's
authority to protect the common good. 25 Moreover, restrictions
exist on these exceptions to the general rule. The death penalty
may be inflicted only on a person judged guilty of a capital crime,
and a just war or justified rebellion is subject to the mandate of
noncombatant immunity, which forbids the direct and intentional
killing of noncombatants. 256 Whether in a just war or any other
circumstance, no one ever has the moral right intentionally and
directly to kill an innocent human being.
As we have seen, however, this moral reasoning has not
uniformly been reflected in the law. The Model Penal Code's
drafters and LaFave and Scott have concluded that the lesser
general evils defense could justify killing an innocent human
being.257 Some of the situations in which the defense might justify
such killing may arguably involve an application of the double
effect principle. 25 On the other hand, the Model Penal Code itself
recognizes that other such cases will not. Take, for example, the
situation we discussed earlier: townspeople must kill their mayor
or everybody in town will be killed.259 Catholic moral teaching
would condemn the killing of the mayor. True, the townspeople
would be acting to bring about a good effect (that is, acting to
save their lives). But, as we have seen, any intentional killing of
another human being outside of just war, justified rebellion, and
capital punishment is morally unjustified. Also, as we have seen,
it is never right to intentionally perform an evil act to achieve
a good end. Killing the mayor would fall outside the double effect
principle because that principle, consistent with these more fun-
damental principles, does not allow a person intentionally to do
an evil act to obtain good results.
253. Id. at no. 2243.
254. See id. (justified rebellion); id. nos. 2312-14 (just war); 3 S.T., Part 1I-Il, Q. 64,
art. 2 (capital punishment). For a more detailed examination of Catholic teaching on
capital punishment (an examination that is beyond this article's scope), see RICE, supra
note 232 at 57-60, and sources cited therein.
255. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, nos. 2263-65, 2321.
256. Id. at nos. 2312-14 (just war), 2266 (capital punishment).
257. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
258. See MODEL PENAL CODE S 3.02, cmt. 3 n.15.
259. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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The Model Penal Code and LaFave and Scott maintain that
necessity could legally justify intentionally killing the mayor,
based strictly on the killing's consequences - the townspeople
will live if the mayor dies. LaFave and Scott state this reasoning:
"[Ilt is better that two lives be saved and one lost than that two
lives be lost and one saved." 260 The suggestion in Holmes that
innocent lifeboat occupants may be sacrificed if the victims are
impartially chosen depends on this same reasoning. The decision
in Rex v. Bourne went even further; it allowed a "less valuable"
life (the unborn's) to be taken to save a "more precious" life (the
mother's).
Compare the Model Penal Code, Holmes, and Bourne with
the decision in Regina v. Dudley and Stevens,2 61 another lifeboat
case. In Dudley and Stevens, three sailors and a cabin boy were
adrift in a lifeboat more than 1,000 miles from land. On the
twentieth day, after nine days without food and seven without
water, two of the sailors, Dudley and Stevens, killed the cabin
boy. They then fed on his flesh and drank his blood for four days
until picked up by a passing ship. Dudley and Stevens were tried
for murder.26 2
Although the jury found that Dudley and Stevens probably
would have died had they not killed and eaten the cabin boy, the
appellate court found that this did not justify the killing. The
contention that the killing could be anything else but murder
was, to the court, "both new and strange."' 26 The court ultimately
rejected the sailors' necessity defense:
[Tihe deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting
boy was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by
some well-recognized excuse admitted by the law .... [Tihere
was in this case no such excuse, unless the killing was justified
by what has been called "necessity." But the temptation to
the act which existed here was not what the law called
necessity. Nor is this to be regretted. Though law and mo-
rality are not the same, and many things may be immoral
which are not necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of
law from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such
divorce would follow if the temptation to murder in this case
were to be held by law [to be] an absolute defense of it. It is
260. LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.4, at 442; see also MODEL PENAL CODE
3.02, cmt. 3, at 15.
261. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
262. Id. at 273-75.
263. Id. at 281.
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not so. To preserve one's life is generally speaking a duty,
but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it
.... [Ilt is enough in a Christian country to remind ourselves
of the Great Example whom we profess to follow. 2 4
Unlike the Model Penal Code, Holmes, and Bourne, the result
in Dudley and Stevens is consistent with sound moral reasoning.
To intentionally kill another innocent human being is morally
unjustifiable. It should also be legally unjustifiable. An abortionist
can hardly be labeled innocent. But even in self-defense or defense
of others, against an aggressor, the intent must be to defend
rather than to kill. Consider two situations. In the first, Able, an
abortionist's assistant in the killing room, suddenly has a change
of heart just as the abortion begins. He intends to defend the
child, not to kill the abortionist. He has a right to use force to
defend the child. In the second situation, Baker, an opponent of
abortion, shoots the abortionist in the parking lot as he is ap-
proaching the building to do abortions a few minutes later. Why
is Able's act, but not Baker's, morally justified?
One difference between the two cases is the harm's immi-
nence or immediacy. St. Thomas speaks of the justified defender
who "repels force with moderation."28 6 Able is acting to repel
force. He engages himself in the child's immediate defense; if he
has no intent but to defend that child, and he has no separate
intent to harm or kill the abortionist, his action is morally
justified. Recall that in justified self-defense or defense of others,
the intent cannot be to kill the aggressor, but rather to stop the
attack. Baker, by contrast, is not in the heat of a physical struggle
to save the child. He is not actually repelling force. Indeed, he
cannot be acting to repel force because the abortionist is not
using force at the time Baker acts. Instead Baker thinks, "I can
get no closer than this. If I do not stop him he will go in there
and murder babies. So I will shoot him in the head." His purpose
or motive is to save children. But his intent in the act he performs
that moment is to blow the baby killer's head off to achieve that
purpose of saving children. Apart from capital punishment, the
just war, or the justified rebellion, which derive from God's
authority, no one may ever intentionally kill anyone. Baker is
intentionally doing an intrinsically evil thing to achieve a good
end. Although his motive is to save babies, in actual intent and
264. Id. at 286-87 (emphasis added).
265. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 2264 (quoting 3 S.T.,
Part II-II, Q. 64, art. 7).
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effect he is acting as the abortionist's executioner. He assumes
God's authority to decide when the abortionist will face God's
final judgement. His act is not morally justified. St. Thomas,
quoting St. Augustine, said that "'A man who, without exercising
public authority, kills an evildoer, shall be judged guilty of
murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power
which God has not given him.' 2 66
We earlier suggested that the temporal limits imposed by
the law on the use of defensive force are flexible enough to allow
argument that killing the abortionist in the parking lot could be
legally justified as in defense of the child because the parking
lot is as close as the killer could get. But we have rejected this
argument as a matter of Catholic moral teaching, which teaches
that killing in defense of oneself or another is justified only if
done actually to resist force and only if there is no separate
intent to kill. Moreover, even if the defender were resisting
imminent force, so that the law would justify his act, his act
could still be immoral. Suppose Freddy happens upon Professor
Able, who is in the process of choking Baker to death. The only
way Freddy can defend Baker is to shoot Professor Able. Freddy,
recognizing this situation, thinks to himself, "Now's my chance
to get Able for giving me a B in torts. I won't have to go to jail
for it because I'm defending Baker. Hasta la vista, baby!" Freddy
then shoots the hated Professor Able to death.
It is possible that Freddy's act could be legally justified,
despite the bad motive or purpose with which Freddy acted.
Freddy has met all the legal requirements of the defense of
others justification: he reasonably believed force was immediately
necessary to protect Baker and he used only that force which
was necessary to defend Baker. The law likely would not inquire
into Freddy's real purpose or motive for shooting Professor
Able. 267 Morally, however, Freddy's act was wrong. Although the
immediate object of Freddy's act was to resist the force against
Baker, Freddy also had the separate intent to kill Professor Able
in revenge for Professor Able's insufficiently generous grading
266. 3 S.T., Part II-II, Q. 64, art. 3; cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *178-
79 (execution by anyone other than proper public authority is murder). As we have noted,
supra note 87, Paul Hill's killing of an abortionist's escort was nothing more than an
unauthorized execution. In terms of Catholic moral doctrine, his shooting of the abortionist
also amounts to an execution, not a justified defense of others. See CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, nos. 1749-1761.
267. See ROBINSON, supra note 36, S 122(b), at 15-16.
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policies.28 The double effect principle would not apply here be-
cause Freddy intended the evil effect (Professor Able's death).
This raises an interesting question: Should the law justify
Freddy's act? One could say that ideally, it should not; the law
should not tolerate any murder. But that is not to say that the
law must refuse to justify Freddy's act. Objectively speaking,
Freddy's act was necessary to save Baker's life from an attack
in progress, which, absent Freddy's bad purpose, would be a
moral act. In fact, it is likely that Freddy did act to save Baker's
life in the sense that but for the need to save Baker, Freddy
would not have killed Professor Able. To inquire into Freddy's
"real reason" for acting would raise delicate issues regarding
intent, purpose, and motive that could exceed the law's practical
competence. One could justify this inquiry; but a law-maker could
also reasonably and morally conclude that such an inquiry is not
worth the cost of possibly deterring justified defensive force.269
St. Thomas was cautious about the law's role in society; he
taught that the law should not try to do too much. This is
reflected in the principle that the law should not try to forbid
every vice, lest the law's unenforcability cause people to despise
it.Y° Moreover, the requirement that murder of innocents be
forbidden is based on the principle that the human law must
forbid vices "without the prohibition of which human society
could not be maintained."'2 1 While it is almost self-evident that
no society could function if the law allowed people to kill each
other at will, it is not so evident that failing to inquire into the
"real purpose" of an actor exercising otherwise morally justified
defensive force would be detrimental to society. 272 A lawmaker
is this situation would be entitled to exercise prudential judgment
268. Cf. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 1755 (an objectively
good act is immoral if done for an evil end).
269. Suppose, for instance, that Freddy had expressed his hatred for Professor Able
to many people but that when he actually confronted Professor Able, his purpose was
pure - he only wanted to save Baker. A prosecutor could use Freddy's prior statements
as evidence that he was really acting to kill Professor Able and that Able's aggression
toward Baker was just a convenient excuse for Freddy to act. In that situation, Freddy
could be convicted of murder even though he was morally blameless and met all the
usual requirements of the defense of others justification. The possibility of such a
conviction, in turn, could deter people from coming to the morally justified defense of
others.
270. 2 S.T., Part I-II Q. 96, art. 2.
271. Id.
272. See supra note 269.
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in determining whether to make acts like Freddy's criminal; and
one could reasonably agree that prudence dictates not prosecut-
ing defendants like Freddy. 273 The most one could demand from
the law would be to impose a stringent imminence requirement,
confining defense of others to actions necessary to immediately
repel force. This requirement would, in effect, act as a proxy for
an intent requirement: the law could presume reasonably that
action taken that is necessary to actually repel force is intended
to repel force, and thus justified. This merely recognizes that
human law, and people who must apply human law, are limited
in their ability to make subtle judgments about a person's sub-
jective reasoning process.
This situation, however, is far removed from the situation
in which a defendant kills an abortionist in the abortuary parking
lot as he arrives at work. As we have seen, the object of the
killing cannot be to repel force because the abortionist is not
using any force at that time. No subtle and difficult determination
of purpose or motive is necessary to conform law to morality in
this case; no matter what the defendant's purpose for killing the
abortionist, his act is still immoral. Also, as we have noted earlier,
if killing the abortionist in the parking lot is justifiable simply
because that is as close as the killer can get, why not allow
killing the abortionist on the golf course or at the video store if
that is the only practical way to stop him? Why not allow open
season on abortionists? This kind of vigilante justice is not
socially desirable and in fact could conceivably destroy society.
One could argue as well that the law must not justify killing the
abortionist in the parking lot. We believe that in any event, a
prudent interest in maintaining civilized society argues strongly
that the law should not allow a defense of others justification in
this situation.
Intentionally killing an abortionist could be justified morally
only if it were incidental to a justified rebellion, in which "armed
resistance to oppression by political authority" would be justi-
fied.274 Five conditions must be met to justify a rebellion against
the government: there must be a "certain, grave, and prolonged
violation of fundamental rights;" "all other means of redress must
273. Contrast this to a situation in which Freddy kills Professor Able without
knowing of Baker's plight, but discovers later to his happy surprise that he actually
saved Baker's life. In such a case, the law likely would not justify Freddy's act and
probably should not. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, S 5.4, at 446; but see ROBINSON,
supra note 36, S 122(b) (arguing for an objective rule of justification in which it would
not matter if the defendant knew of the circumstances justifying his action).
274. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 205, no. 2243.
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have been exhausted;" rebellion "will not provoke worse disor-
ders;" the rebellion carries "a well-founded hope of success;" and
it must be "impossible reasonably to foresee any better solu-
tion. 2 75 A justified rebellion involves the assumption by private
persons of the prerogative of the state to wage a just war. In a
rebellion the war is waged against the state itself. The rebellion
itself would be a just war, in which the abortionist, as someone
directly a part of the "grave ... violation of fundamental rights"
justifying the rebellion, would be rightly regarded as a combatant
and therefore a legitimate target.26 It is true that in Roe v. Wade
and later cases, the Supreme Court, with the cooperation of
Congress and the Executive branch, has stripped an entire class
of human beings of legal protection and has precipitated an
unraveling of the American civic fabric. In that sense, there has
been a grave violation of fundamental rights. However, it cannot
legitimately be concluded that the situation has disintegrated so
far beyond other means of correction that armed rebellion is
justified in whole or in part. For one thing, hope of success would
be speculative at best. Moreover, if the legal means of changing
government in a democratic republic are still open, it is likely
that if sufficient popular support existed for the rebellion to have
a "well-founded hope of success," sufficient support to end the
rights violation legally would exist also. Sanctioning rebellion
would just invite "worse disorders" by implicitly inviting revo-
lutionary action by the disaffected and unstable.
Rebellion is not something to be lightly sanctioned. The just
war waged by a government is limited by the fact that it can be
waged only by the duly constituted public authority. A rebellion,
by contrast, involves an assumption of all or part of the public
authority by private persons who themselves decide that they
are justified in taking over the state's power in whole or in part.
And if one person can so decide, so can another. In 1967, Pope
Paul VI said that "a revolutionary uprising - save where there
is manifest long-standing tyranny which would do great damage
to fundamental personal rights and dangerous harm to the com-
mon good of the country - produces new injustices, throws more
elements out of balance and brings on new disasters. '' "
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. POPE PAUL VI, POPULORUM PROGRESSIO, [ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLES] no.
31 (NCWC News Serv. trans., 1967).
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The divine prohibition of intentional and direct killing (apart
from capital punishment and the just war, including justified
rebellion) is absolute. In his 1993 encyclical, Veritatis Splendor,
Pope John Paul II stated:
The negative precepts of the natural law are universally valid.
They oblige each and every individual, always and in every
circumstance. It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a
given action semper et pro semper, without exception, because
the choice of this kind of behavior is in no case compatible
with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his
vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbor.
It is prohibited - to everyone and in every case - to violate
these precepts. They oblige everyone, regardless of the cost,
never to offend in anyone, beginning with oneself, the per-
sonal dignity common to all .... The Church has always
taught that one may never choose kinds of behavior prohib-
ited by the moral commandments expressed in negative form
in the Old and New Testaments. 278
If it is morally illicit to kill the abortionist, can a person at
least inflict a non-lethal injury or property damage on abortion-
ists? Instead of killing the abortionist, can a person break his
arms to prevent him from killing babies? Or can a person destroy
his property to put economic pressure on him to stop killing
babies? Recall that we raised these possibilities in considering
whether a person could show it was necessary, in legal terms,
to kill an abortionist.279 But in moral terms, even the intentional
infliction of a non-lethal injury would probably be unjustified. If
Baker intentionally wounded the abortionist in the driveway, for
example, by shooting him in the arm, that act would still lack
the imminence necessary for defense of others because Baker
would not actually be resisting force. It would therefore seem to
be unjustified in principle. In response to the question "Whether
it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?"
St. Thomas rejected the infliction of "harm" which is not sanc-
tioned by public authority: "It is lawful for any private individual
to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody:
but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by
virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to
decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the
278. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 230, no. 52.
279. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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whole.."280 Thus, to inflict any intentional physical harm on abor-
tionists is morally unjustifiable.
Invasion of property rights by trespass or destruction or
damage of property is probably unjustified on prudential grounds.
Those who rescue or bomb may save lives, but legal sidewalk
counselors also can claim success in saving lives, and they can
be at the abortuary day after day rather than wasting time on
their civil and legal defenses. 21 Illegal activity, particularly vio-
lence, also can be counterproductive. It distracts attention from
the real, spiritual nature of the abortion problem, generates
adverse publicity for the pro-life movement, motivates the pas-
sage of draconian laws directed at pro-lifers such as FACE, and
diverts pro-life efforts from more useful approaches. More im-
portantly, it can accelerate the disintegration of the civil order
with predictably harmful impact on the common good.282
All these prudential concerns apply with even greater force
to killing abortionists. And the killing raises another concern:
How can one be sure that an abortionist will not someday repent,
stop killing, and perhaps even work for the pro-life cause? One
may argue this is unlikely. But in the early 1970s, Dr. Bernard
Nathanson operated the largest abortuary in New York. If a Paul
Hill had decided at that time to kill Nathanson, the pro-life
movement would have been deprived of one of its most articulate
spokesmen, a man whose work has probably saved more babies'
lives than the Pensacola killings.
In any event, what is really wrong in the pro-life movement
is that for two decades the movement has approached abortion
as a legal and political problem. In a good-faith effort to "save
lives," the leaders of the establishment pro-life movement have
proposed one compromise after another, affirming in their actions,
despite their rhetoric, that the right to life is alienable - and
therefore that the unborn child is a nonperson who, though
innocent, may be executed in at least some cases. Moreover,
Christians and others who deeply oppose abortion have supported
280. 3 S.T., Part II-II, Q. 64, art. 3.
281. See Rice, supra note 9, at 32.
282. These objections probably have less force in the case of non-violent rescues
than in the case of damage or destruction to property. One could argue that a non-violent
rescue "draws public attention to the abortion problem and thereby promotes a solution
through creative tension on the streets and in the courts." Id. at 33. But rescuers still
must spend time defending themselves legally that they could have spent engaged in
more productive pro-life work.
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candidates for public office who believe that abortion should be
legal, simply because these candidates favor more restrictions on
legal abortion than their opponents. This approach does more
harm than good by permeating the public discourse with the
message that even pro-life "leaders" think that innocent life is
negotiable, thus suggesting that even pro-lifers do not take se-
riously their own rhetoric about the unborn's humanity and the
inalienability of the right to live. This, in turn, leads others not
to take such rhetoric seriously and undercuts the pro-life mes-
sage.
Bombing and shooting exacerbate the problem: The pro-
death forces who dominate our government would like nothing
more than to see the pro-life movement disintegrate in spasms
of bombing and shooting. Such would confirm the pro-death
assumption that there is no objective morality and that the issue
is reducible to the utilitarian exercise of power. It is therefore
more important than ever to reject violence in the pro-life cause.
It may be a cliche, but it is still true that two wrongs do not
make a right; they simply make two wrongs.
III. CONCLUSION
It is possible to argue that under commonly applied criminal
law principles, killing an abortionist as he arrives at the abor-
tuary is a legally justified use of force in defending another.
However, it is unlikely that any court would accept that argu-
ment, primarily on the grounds that force used to prevent abor-
tion is unjustified because the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe
v. Wade and its progeny have made abortion a woman's consti-
tutionally protected right. One could argue that Roe's holding is
a perversion of the Fourteenth Amendment which the Supreme
Court purported to interpret, and that, in any event, abortion is
unlawful under God's higher law. Courts operating in the present
milieu of positivist jurisprudence would likely turn a deaf ear to
these arguments; the Supreme Court and the legislatures have
spoken; the case is closed. In any event, intentionally harming
abortionists is not morally justified, and the law should not (and
probably may not legitimately) sanction such clearly immoral
conduct.
Forsaking violence does not leave pro-lifers powerless. In-
stead, it frees the movement to rely completely on its strongest
weapons: the truth and prayer.
Pro-lifers should speak the truth in the political realm. No
candidate who believes that the law should authorize the exe-
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cution of the innocent, born or unborn, is fit to hold public office.
Pro-lifers should not support - let alone propose - any law
which would authorize execution of the unborn in any case. It is
time to go back to the position taken by Roman Catholic Cardinals
Krol, Medeiros, Manning, and Cody in their Senate testimony in
1974. Speaking on behalf of the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops, they took to the Senate the N.C.C.B. post-Roe procla-
mation that urged "legal and constitutional conformity to the
basic truth that the unborn child is a 'person' in every sense of
the term from conception." They refused to support the pro-
posed Buckley Amendment to the Constitution because it would
have allowed abortion to save the mother's life. And they insisted
that "the prohibition against direct and intentional taking of
human life should be universal and without exceptions." 2 4 Prag-
matism does not work because it dilutes this message. Pro-lifers
must proclaim - in the media, in the courts, in journals, in crisis
pregnancy centers, and in front of the abortuaries - the reality
that the only coherent basis for affirming absolute rights in the
human person is that he is an immortal creature made in the
image and likeness of God, with a dignity which absolutely
transcends the state's interests.
Most importantly, the pro-life movement must put its pri-
mary reliance on prayer. All pro-lifers should pray within their
own tradition. What is important is that pro-lifers pray for this
country, for the women who contemplate, or who have committed,
abortion, and especially for the abortionists and all who support
them.
Philosophers and politicians have tried for three centuries,
and especially in the last few decades in this country, to build a
society as if God did not exist. But their effort is a total failure.
As John Paul II has stated, the Christian Restoration of faith
and culture is well underway. The pro-life movement can play an
important part in that restoration, not by violence, but by ad-
hering to objective moral principle, speaking the truth without
compromise, and most importantly, by praying.
283. NAT'L CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, DOCUMENTATION ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND
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